Tales Of 2 DOJ Hearings; Mayor Keller, the City, APD, Union Lambast Federal Monitor; Police Reform Advocates Lambast City And DOJ’s Combined Failure’s; Federal Judge Should Act “Sua Sponte”, Appoint APD Receiver, Dismiss CASA As “Historical” And Unenforceable

On November 12, 2021 the Federal Court Appointed Monitor James Ginger filed with the Federal Court his 14th “Compliance Levels of the Albuquerque Police Department and the City of Albuquerque with Requirements of the Court Approved Settlement Agreement” (CASA). The report was one of the most critical and scathing to date as to the city’s intentional noncompliance and failure to investigate hundreds of police use of force cases. The report covers the time frame of February 1, 2021 to July 31, 2021. The link to review the entire 331-page report is here:

https://documents.cabq.gov/police/reports/department-of-justice/independent-monitors-fourteenth-report-nov-2021.pdf

HIGHLIGHTS OF 14TH INDEPENDANT MAONITOR’S REPORT

Quoting the 14th Monitors Report, following are the most critical highlights of the 14th Monitor’s Report:

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS BACKLOG HARSHLY CRITICIZED BY MONITOR

“The most important issues affecting APD during the IMR-14 reporting period involve misconduct investigations, use of force investigations, the lack of progressive discipline when misconduct is found, and supervision and leadership.

All non-force-related misconduct investigations completed by APD … were found to be deficient. A total of 17 misconduct cases, 6 investigated by Internal Affairs and 9 area command investigations were reviewed, including two that were completed by outside agencies.

The only properly investigated case reviewed by the monitoring team this reporting period was completed by an outside agency. In two consecutive reporting periods, a virtual shut down of use of force investigations has occurred in Internal Affairs.

Only seven, or 3%, of the 216 Level 2 cases opened were closed. Only 1 of those 7 was completed within 90 days, or less than one-half of a percent. Only two of 91 Level 3 use of force cases opened during this period were completed by [Internal Affairs Force Division] IFD or 2%. Neither of the 2 cases were completed within the CASA required 90-day period.

We find these failings to be more than notable, given the amount of time the monitoring team spent with APD in the last three reporting periods specifically focused on process improvement processes at [the Internal Affairs Force Division] IAFD. Of the twelve cases reviewed for compliance concerning discipline, only 58% met the requirements for adherence to progressive discipline as outlined in the CASA.

A second backlog of 667 uninvestigated use of force cases … was reported. This second backlog is more than double the initial backlog APD dealt with from 2018-2020 and does not include any of the contemporary cases left uninvestigated by IAFD.

Approximately 83% of these cases are already time-barred for discipline in accordance with the CBA [police union contract] , should misconduct be found. Since its discovery, this backlog has been reduced from 667 cases to 660 cases as of October 25, 2021. At this rate of case productivity, we project that it will take APD 94 months to “clear” this second backlog, which, again, would ensure no disciplinary actions for policy violations in another 667 cases.”

INTENTIONAL BACKLOG AND NON-COMPLIANCE

“Given the amount of focus on the problems related to [the Internal Affairs Force Division] IAFD investigations in previous monitor’s reports, and the exceptional amounts of technical assistance provided by the monitoring team relating to IAFD processes, we can only conclude that this new backlog was intentional, and yet another canard designed to ensure that officers are not disciplined for known policy violations. We consider this another example of deliberate non-compliance exhibited by APD.

Leadership and supervision, especially in the critical areas of reform listed above, are simply lacking—or in some cases not extant. As such, these findings require direct action by the City and APD leadership to identify the causes of, and to take corrective actions responding to, what can only be described as deliberate failures to comply with existing APD policy and with CASA requirements.

Given the extensive amounts of technical assistance provided by the monitoring team related to misconduct investigations and to workload management, we can only conclude that these jarring failures are deliberate.

This reform project’s evaluation process, i.e., the manner in which the monitoring team assesses and reports progress on the required reforms, has been closely aligned to the measurable tenets of effective management.

First, the methodology closely conforms with the concept that effective management is based on developing cogent and coherent policies (articulation of acceptable activities required of police personnel).

Officers, supervisors, managers, and leaders must be clearly “on notice” of organizational expectations, so that they understand and are willing to adhere to those expectations. Once these reformative policies have been articulated, all involved personnel (recruits, officers, supervisors, and managers) must be trained to the point that they understand and are capable of implementing these policies.”

DELIBERATE FAILURE BY APD MANAGEMENT

“The monitor’s oversight process for APD during the past six years has been based on this near-universal understanding of police operational management and control. After six years of implementation, APD has fallen significantly short in its ability to engender the supervisory, managerial, and leadership efforts that have been demonstrated much earlier in other law enforcement agencies monitored in this manner.

The fact that this planned change process works, and can work well, is documented in the fact that a large majority of this monitor’s staff working on the Albuquerque Police Department monitoring process are past members of organizations that have been directly monitored by the current APD monitor.
These team members have “lived the change process” and done so successfully in their respective agencies, thus are uniquely situated to guide APD successfully through the change process.

Given the amount of technical assistance provide to APD by members of this monitoring team; given the fact that for every “out-of-compliance” outcome found by the monitor, there are recommendations developed to guide APD into compliance; given the inordinate amounts of “technical assistance” provided to APD by 4 members of the monitoring team over the past six years.

The monitor can only conclude, based on his knowledge, training and experience, that these failures at APD are deliberate.”

FORCE REVIEW BOARD

“We have noted critical potential issues with APD’s Force Review Board this reporting period, including our assessment that the number of uses of force requiring review by [the Force Review Board] FRB are likely to overload the review and assessment mechanism. This speaks as much to APD’s inability (or unwillingness) to control unnecessary or improper uses of force as it does to the efficacy of the Force Review Board itself.

The sheer volume of reported uses of force by APD officers threatens to overload the oversight system. This is both a commentary on the magnitude of reportable uses of force effectuated by APD officers and the relative inability or unwillingness of APD field commanders to call out improper uses of force.

As with past reporting periods, however, the central CASA requirements related to use of force continue to need a great deal of scrutiny and oversight if APD is to reach full compliance with the requirements of the CASA.”

OPERATIONAL COMPLIANCE STATIC

“For the last seven reporting periods, operational compliance levels have been virtually static, with operational compliance levels holding at or near an average of 62 percent. Actual data points range from a low of 59 percent (IMR-8 and IMR-13) to a high of 66 percent (IMR-11).

Our assessment is that APD has dealt with the low hanging fruit of the CASA and has deliberately failed to deal with the issues that are the crux of the reform process: officers’ tendencies to use unnecessary force, to under-report (or fail to report) uses of force, and supervisory and oversight personnel’s unwillingness to identify, classify, and correct these issues.

Obviously, use of force practices are a key element of the reform process. To date, APD, as an organization, has simply refused to deal effectively with pressing use of force issues. The monitoring team has provided, and continues to, provide more technical assistance to APD than any other police department it has monitored.

For the most part, that technical assistance is not implemented by APD when it comes to identifying, classifying, investigating, and correcting unnecessary uses of force by its personnel.

The monitor is convinced that, at this point, failures by APD to deal with improper uses of force are related to will, not ability.”

DECEMBER 16 HEARING

On December 16, 2021 a hearing on the 14th Federal Monitor’s Report was held where the Federal Monitor presented his report and the City, the Department of Justice and Third-Party Intervenor Police Union were allowed to give their reaction to the 14th report. The 14th Federal Monitor’s Report resulted in a full throttle assault and condemnation of the Federal Monitor by the City, APD and the police union directed at the process, the language used by the monitor and what he reported as the failures of APD.

CITY ATTORNEY REACTS

City Attorney Esteban Aguilar, Jr. had this to say:

“Using … inflammatory hyperbolic language is improper editorializing in a whole lot of areas. … It improperly ascribes intent to the work of our officers, the women and men who are on the ground, trying to not only keep us safe, but trying to implement all of the provisions of constitutional community-based policing. … We have failures, you know, we still have … 37% operational compliance to attain, so we do have a long way to go. … But we’re not at the beginning of this process. And, I think it does a disservice to the work of the department, but also the work of the community members who have been engaged in this process, and who have been actually asking for meaningful change as well, because we’ve been walking with them step by step throughout this process.”

APD CHIEF HAROLD MEDINA REACTS

APD Chief Medina condemned the 14th Federal Monitor report saying it’s easy for someone who is thousands of miles away” to point at APD’s problems and saying it’s intentional. Medina claims that everyone is working to comply in the best way they can and he had this to say:

“It’s a matter that we don’t know how to do stuff to their liking, or to their standards. … I think that’s been a problem from the very beginning is that instantly when APD fails, they’re tagged by the monitoring team, DOJ, as ‘Oh, APD is resisting this.’ No, you guys are all here because APD sometimes doesn’t know how to do this stuff. And that’s what we should be doing is if we’re doing it wrong, correct us more quickly, and give us the lag time to put the fixes in place.”

Medina said he agreed with parts of the report and acknowledge there is more work to done particularly with some officers in the ranks who are not doing what is required under the consent decree. Medina had this to say:

“There may be individual officers that may be deliberately not doing something they need to do. … The thing I take offense to is that leadership questions that this isn’t being supported by leadership.”

https://www.kob.com/albuquerque-news/apd-chief-disappointed-with-latest-doj-monitor-report/6306468/?cat=500

APD UNION REACTS

Shaun Willoughby, president of the Albuquerque Police Officer’s Association, had this to say about the 14th Federal Monitor’s Report:

“Dr. Ginger is pointing the finger at APD, saying that they’re doing this intentionally. That’s an absolute absurd joke. It’s a lie. … The monitor was supposed to be here in Albuquerque, helping with technical assistance. He’s doing that over Zoom and over phone calls from a different state.”

EDITORS COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: What Willoughby has never acknowledged in public is that the monitor did live here for a while and it is not just him doing all the work. The monitor and his team of 10 on a regular basis, met with city officials by zoom or have come to the city. For the last 2 years, the pandemic has forced changes to the way business is done. For the last 2 years, the Federal Court has held hearings in the case by zoom and Willoughby has not complained. Ginger is an officer of the court and works for the court and should be able to do the auditing remotely. The federal monitor’s reports and the data being collected is done by a team who review data and work with APD to give them guidance. The Federal Monitor himself has met with community leaders privately and in the past attended public meetings and has made presentations to the city council on his reports.

https://www.koat.com/article/albuquerque-police-department-responds-to-doj-monitor-report/38285085

APD FORWARD REACTS

APD Forward is a coalition of 27 police reform advocacy groups and community stakeholders that were instrumental in petitioning in bringing the Department of Justice to the city to investigate APD’s use of deadly force. The American Civil Liberties New Mexico chapter is part of APD Forward and acts as it main spokesperson. Barron Jones, a senior policy strategist with the ACLU, said after reading the report, it’s clear that APD still has a lot of work to do and said:

“Unfortunately, it’s more of the same [from APD]. … While we recognize the department’s efforts to improve training and that the performance metric unit is up and helping folks analyze trends we believe that the crux of the reform lies in the department’s ability to address bad behavior, or out of policy violations. That doesn’t seem to be happening yet during another monitor report.

“It just sort of boils down to are they completing those use of force investigations in a timely manner, in a way that [APD] … leadership can take corrective action and address behavior before it gets out of hand. You know, the department can make all the changes in the world, but if they can’t get that component right, then the reform process is falling flat.”

KELLER ANNOUNCES NEW “PUSHBACK” TACTIC DEALING WITH CASA

On January 13, 2022, Channel 4 broadcast a story of Mayor Tim Keller giving a luncheon speech on January 11 to the Greater Chamber of Commerce. Keller used the opportunity to announce a new strategy on how to deal with the CASA. Keller was asked what is the City’s strategy going forward to deal with the ongoing federal oversight of the Albuquerque Police Department.

Mayor Tim Keller responded while the news camera was rolling:

“I thought, we’ll just say yes [to the settlement]. We’ll get it done, because – kind of before – there was a lot of resistance. Well, neither of those strategies work. Resistance didn’t work. Just saying yes, also didn’t work. . . . We have to do what is right for the Albuquerque Police Department and the City of Albuquerque. … That is different based on what they think we should do based on Maryland. Or what they think we should do based on LA. That’s been a huge part of the problem.”

Chief Administration Officer Sarita Nair and Shawn Willoughby, the President of the Albuquerque Police Officers’ Association were both interviewed by Channel 4 for the same story that featured Keller.

Willoughby had this to say:

“I can wholeheartedly understand that when Mayor Keller first took office four years ago, after the resistance that the DOJ and the City of Albuquerque had, he wanted to be a bridge-builder. And, they definitely went that strategy. … This needs to come down to action. … That use of force policy needs to be changed immediately. The City of Albuquerque is the plaintiff and they have the right to run this city and run this police department.”

EDITOR’S COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: Willoughby’s demand that the use of force policy needs to be changed immediately” is hypocritical seeing as he sat at the bargaining table to negotiate the policy and he contributed to the full one year delay in drafting the use of force policy. In the past, the Federal Monitor noted the reason for the one year delay was upwards of 50 amendments and changes demanded by the union. Simply put, the police union does not want any kind of a “use of force” or “deadly force policy” and wants sworn officers to have 100% total discretion to decide when to use force or deadly force and under what circumstances.

Chief Administration Officer Sarita Nair boldly proclaimed:

“[The Federal Monitor] is supposed to just grade us on the policies we have and whether we’re doing them or not, he’s not supposed to be monkeying around with personnel, he’s not supposed to be taking stances that are intended to change behavior. … We need to continue to push back on that.”

EDITOR’S COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: CAO Nair’s comments that “he’s not supposed to be monkeying around with personnel, he’s not supposed to be taking stances that are intended to change behavior reveal a remarkable ignorance of the CASA and the purpose and intent of the CASA. The settlement provisions are very clear that the Federal Monitor has no management, nor control over APD personnel, nor over the day to day operations of APD. The Federal Monitor cannot hire or discipline APD personnel. During the February 9 hearing, Judge Browning also pointed out that it is inherent in the Federal Monitor’s duties and responsibilities to take stances that are intended to change APD’s behavior to achieve constitutional policing.

The link to the full Channel 4 report is here:

https://www.kob.com/albuquerque-news/doj-oversight-of-apd-mayor-keller-announces-newstrategy/6357869/

FEBRUARY 9, 2022 HEARING

On February 9, Federal Judge James Browning held a second hearing on the 14th Federal Monitor’s Report to allow “amicus curiae” or friends of the Court and police reform advocates to offer their say to the Federal Monitors 14th report.

The February 14 hearing was a dramatic contrast with the December 16 hearing. The members of the community and police reform advocates expressed support of the Federal Monitor. The hearing was also a full throttle complaint session that the city continues to fail to implement the reforms.

APD police reform advocates made it clear and showed their frustration that they feel the Department of Justice is not doing its job to hold APD accountable for its deliberate failure to come into compliance with CASA reforms. Police reform advocates criticized the Department of Justice no longer being committed to the police reform process and being derelict in its duty to hold the city accountable for intentional violations of the court order.

The plaintiffs in the case of McClendon v. City of Albuquerque went so far as to advocate that APD and the City be held in civil contempt of court for deliberate and willful violations of the CASA. The Court was asked to place APD into receivership.

PARTICPANTS WHO TESTIFIED

Gary Housepian, the Executive director of Disability Rights New Mexico, bluntly asked if the Keller Administration and APD administration were still committed to bringing constitutional policing to Albuquerque. Housepian aggressively pushed back on APD’s and the City’s false rhetoric linking high violent crime to the CASA reform efforts. Last year the APD police union conducted a $70,000 media campaign to discredit the reforms and pushed the false narrative that the CASA reforms are causing increases in the city’s crime rates and keeping sworn police from doing their job.

Vickie Williams, the representative from the Community Policing Councils (CPCs), citizen groups created by the Court Approved Settlement Agreement to engage in dialogue with the police department, said the CPC’s feel “left out, disrespected and unappreciated,” and didn’t have enough resources to be effective.

Alfred Mathewson, along with attorney and state Representative Antonio Maestas, and attorney Stephen Torres, is counsel for the Amici group known as the Community Coalition. The coalition, a collaboration arising out of the Martin Luther King Task Force on Social Justice organized by Jewel Hall, includes among others the Albuquerque Center for Peace and Justice, Hispano Roundtable of New Mexico, New Mexico LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), and SWOP (Southwest Organizing Project). Mathewson raised the issue that after 7 years and millions spent, how much longer and how much will it take for APD to finally come into compliance with the reforms. He expressed community fears that the city is facing upwards of 4 and a half years more of DOJ oversight. He expressed totally frustration with the DOJ’s failure to act. Mathewson said a goal should be set that all the reforms should be completed within 2 years.

Dan Walter, the retiring chair of the Mental Health Response Advisory Committee criticized the Keller Administrations new Community Safety department, made up of first responders tasked with handling mental health and homelessness calls, for not involving the board or asking for advice when developing policies and procedures.

MOST DAMNING NARRATIVE PRESENTED

Civil Rights Attorney Peter Cubra, a highly experienced attorney who represents the McClendon subclass representing incarcerated people, said he was horrified by Mayor Keller Administration’s attacks on the independent monitor and his finding of APD’s failed progress. Cubra said the case is in the worse position of any case he has seen in these types of cases. Cubra told Judge Browning:

“In recent times, the city of Albuquerque has done the most shocking things I’ve ever seen in one of these kinds of lawsuits. … Their horrific levels of non-compliance alone would be the basis for civil contempt.”

In his February 3, 2022 letter to Judge James Browning for the hearing, Cubra emphasized the follow points:

1. “[The city” is not coming close to complying with the court orders which they asked [the] Court to enter as a consent decree in 2014.”

2. “[APD] intentionally stopped investigating alleged violations of the CASA and the Fourth Amendment by its employees allowing [police officer] violators to go uninvestigated and undisciplined.

3. “[The city] has not hired a permanent Superintendent of Police reform and is generally not being reasonably diligent in attempting to accomplish what they stipulated should be done; without ever asking for modifications or suspension of the provisions they are knowingly violating”

4. “Since the Independent Monitor issued his Fourteenth Report, City Officials have repeatedly publicly attacked the Monitor, undermining the Court’s authority and integrity as well as the effectiveness of the Monitor’s work. The City is currently using its web site to attack the Independent Monitor.”

5. According to the Cubra letter and quoting statements made, city officials, including Mayor Tim Keller, Chief Administrative Officer Sarita Nair, APD Chief Harold Medina and the Police Union President have all engaged in unfounded public attacks and false statements about the Federal Independent Monitor, his work performance and his work product.

6. “The City suspended altogether its efforts to comply with its obligation to investigate uses of force, but never asked the Court either to suspend its obligations or for a modification of its obligations.”

7. “During the reporting period, the Internal Affairs Force Division completed just one level 2 and 3 use of force investigations within the 90-day time period outlined in the CASA. As of October 25, 2021, IAFD had a 660-case backlog of uninvestigated level 2 and 3 use of force cases. The majority of those 660 cases, 93 percent, are older than 90 days and more than 80 percent are too old to discipline the officers if IAFD investigators uncover misconduct.

8. The monitoring team … reported on the City’s continuing failure to comply with the CASA provisions regarding how its officers interact with individuals who are experiencing behavioral health crises.

9. “The Fourteenth IMR shows continued and chronic noncompliance. As was made clear during the December hearing, violations of the CASA are numerous and chronic.”

10. “The Department of Justice (DOJ) appears to be so overtaxed by its myriad responsibilities in other matters that it has not initiated any motions practice to address the problems … . The DOJ … has the inherent authority to seek a contempt finding herein. … However, counsel for the United States have not filed a motion seeking to enforce the CASA, despite filing numerous reports since 2017 that irrefutably show that noncompliance is chronic and, often, deliberate.”

Cubra said that he was dismayed the Department of Justice had not taken action and urged U.S. District Judge James Browning to do so instead. The Court has declined to take any action.

The McClendon subclass concluded with the following requests.

1. It requested Judge Browning to promptly convene a show cause hearing to determine if the City’s actions constitute contempt of court, and, if so, to appoint a receiver to manage the City’s implementation of the CASA; and

2. To allow counsel for the amici to call witnesses, introduce evidence and otherwise participate actively at the show cause hearing in light of the failure of the United States to “seek enforcement of the provisions of” the CASA and to act to protect the authority and integrity of the Independent Monitor and the CASA from unwarranted attack.

The Court has repeatedly declined to take any action requested by the friends of the court or amici groups and police reform advocates.

MAYOR KELLER’S PUSHBACK TACTIC

During the February 9, hearing Judge James Browning went out of his way to quote Mayor Keller and asked what Keller meant when Keller told the Chamber of Commerce:

“I thought, we’ll just say yes [to the settlement]. We’ll get it done, because – kind of before – there was a lot of resistance. Well, neither of those strategies work. Resistance didn’t work. Just saying yes, also didn’t work. . . . We have to do what is right for the Albuquerque Police Department and the City of Albuquerque. … That is different based on what they think we should do based on Maryland. Or what they think we should do based on LA. That’s been a huge part of the problem.”

Attorney Carlos Pacheco who was representing the City during the hearing responded he was not at all sure what the Mayor meant. However, Pacheco did offer an opinion that what differentiates the City of Albuquerque’s consent decree from all others in the country is that it is unique, deals with APD’s interactions with the mentally ill and you cannot rely on what is working in those other city’s as being what is needed in Albuquerque. Browning acknowledged the opinion was a reasonable explanation for the Mayor’s comments.

DOJ, APD AND POLICE UNION PUSH BACK

During the February 9 hearing, the City and the Department of Justice affirmed their commitment to seeing the court-mandated reforms through to create lasting change. However, both pushed back against the criticism.

Department of Justice Attorney Paul Killebrew said the goal is not merely to get the city past the finish line, but also to foster sustainable reforms. Killebrew said this:

“All options remain on the table … So, on an ongoing basis, we’re examining what is happening with compliance and what are the steps that we need to take to move compliance along to help APD reach the goals of the consent decree and to protect the people of Albuquerque from unconstitutional policing.”

APD Chief Harold Medina, appearing by zoom in a coat and tie and not his customary open neck polo shirt with an APD emblem he is known to wear in public, was highly defensive and said he was doing all he could with the resources he has. He also said that means pushing back on the independent monitor on findings he disagrees with.

Medina put it this way:

“If I had an unlimited budget and unlimited resources, I’d have every position hired necessary for us to go into compliance. … The simple fact of the matter is I don’t. I have given every civilian position that I can to compliance, so I can get sworn people going out to enforce laws.”

The link to quoted news source material is here:

https://www.abqjournal.com/2469066/police-reform-advocates-express-frustration-at-city-doj.html

EDITOR’S COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: It’s laughable that Medina told Judge Browning that if he had “unlimited budget and unlimited resources, I’d have every position hired necessary for us to go into compliance.” The truth is, APD has been given all funding it has asked for during the last 4 years under Mayor Keller and still APD fails to get the job done right.

APD is the largest budgeted department in the city’s history. APD’s approved general fund operating 2022 budget is upwards of $222 million. The City Council has approved all the APD funding the Keller Administration has ever requested. Medina for his part has doubled the number of Deputy Chiefs, increased the Chief’s office command staff from 3 to 10 and has added a new level of management of 14 assistant commanders. The new negotiated police contract makes APD the best-paid law enforcement agency in the region by increasing hourly pay by 8% and longevity pay by 5%, and creating a whole new category of incentive pay.

POLICE UNION CONTRACT SIGNED

During the February 9 hearing, Police Union Attorney Fred Mower categorically denied that there is a “deliberate counter casa effect”. Mower said there is a personnel shortage. Despite what police union lawyer Mower said, the federal monitor has repeatedly documented instances of “deliberate counter casa effect.”

It was in the Federal Monitors 10th audit report that the “Counter CASA” effect was defined. According to the Federal Monitor:

“Sergeants and lieutenants, at times, go to extreme lengths to excuse officer behaviors that clearly violate established and trained APD policy, using excuses, deflective verbiage, de minimis comments and unsupported assertions to avoid calling out subordinates’ failures to adhere to established policies and expected practice. Supervisors (sergeants) and mid-level managers (lieutenants) routinely ignore serious violations, fail to note minor infractions, and instead, consider a given case “complete”.

Mower told Judge Browning that the current union contract is the previous contract that has expired with identical terms and that only salary pay increases were negotiated. That may be the case, but Police Union President Shaun Willoughby himself has said there were certain provisions of the contract that were “no starters” for negotiations such as the time frame increased to investigate police misconduct cases and if sergeants and lieutenants should be allowed to be in the union.

The police union contract containing the pay increases was signed on December 30, 2021 by Mayor Tim Keller, City Attorney Estaban Aguilar, City Clerk Ethan Watson and Police Union President Shaun Willoughby. The 48-page APOA police “Collective Bargaining Agreement” (CBA) is for 1 year and 6 months period. It is effective January 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023. The new CBA can be down loaded as a PDF file at this link:

https://www.cabq.gov/humanresources/documents/apoa-jul-9-2016.pdf/view

PLAN UNVEILED TO DEAL WITH BACKLOG OF USE OF FORCE CASES

According to the 14th Federal Monitor’s Report, there is a 667 backlog of use of force cases. Of the backlog, 83% are older than 120 days, and under the settlement officers cannot be disciplined if it was discovered they had violated policies. Notwithstanding, the DOJ is demanding that APD clear the 660-case backlog to determine the extent of police misconduct.

During the February 6 status conference hearing, APD unveiled a plan to tackle the 660-case backlog of uninvestigated level 2 and 3 use of force cases. Level 2 use of force is when an officer has to use force and the person is not injured. Level 3 includes anything that sends someone to the hospital or death, like officer-involved shootings. The Department of Justice has complained that APD doesn’t investigate use of force cases thoroughly and they are slow to look into cases.

Zak Cottrell, the Interim Deputy Superintendent of Police Reform said such investigations “[Are] actually a very extensive investigation, they can take a lot of time – a lot of video has to be reviewed, make sure officer statements match what’s on the video.”

APD wants the External Force Investigative Team (EFIT) established last year to help them out and sort through the cases. The City established the External Force Investigation Team (EFIT) to assist the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) in conducting use of force investigations by APD officers, while also assisting APD with improving the quality of its use of force by police investigations. The EFIT team is supposed to be temporary to train APD Internal Affairs investigators on how to properly investigate uses of force instances by APD police officers.

APD is seeking the EFIT to expand its scope of work and tackle the backlog of cases that formed through the first half of 2021. Currently, APD has 25 sworn officers and civilians working on the EFIT. APD is working with EFIT, along with their own officers, to look at the backlog of cases. APD, the City, and the Department of Justice are in the process of negotiating the contract with the External Force Investigative Team. If it is approved, the contract would cover 2 years.

The police union says APD should be looking at their policy rather than spending $3 million on the program. Shaun Willoughby, president of the Albuquerque Police Officers Association, had this to say:

“We’ve had backlog after backlog after backlog, and the real nooks and cranny of the problem we are always going to be in a backlog. There is always going to be a backlog at this police department until the police department changes the policy.”

EDITOR’S COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: Willoughby once again deflects any and all responsivity of his union membership contributing to the “backlog after backlog” with their intentional obstructionist’s tactics as sergeants and lieutenants refuse to hold subordinates accountable for will violations of policy.

The link to quoted news source material is here:

https://www.krqe.com/news/crime/plan-unveiled-to-tackle-apds-use-of-force-backlog/#:~:text=Plan%20unveiled%20to%20tackle%20APD’s%20use%20of%20force%20backlog&text=During%20a%20federal%20hearing%20Wednesday,and%20sort%20through%20the%20cases.
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

During the February 6 hearing, Federal District Judge James Browning raised the issue with his line of questioning if the CASA has now become more of a “historical document”. The point he ostensibly was making is that the CASA is no longer relevant to current times as opposed to an ongoing “living document”, as Judge James Browning described it, or a court order that needs to be modified to changing times. Judge Browning noted that their seems to have been a shift in public opinion without elaborating.

CHANGING TIMES DEMAND CHANGES IN APPROACH

One thing is certain. After 7 years, things have changed drastically with law enforcement not only in the city but nationally because of the “Black Lives Movement” and the killing of African American George Floyd by police. Judge Browning asked the Department of Justice if it was still committed to the CASA. Not at all surprising is DOJ Attorney Paul Killebrew said yes. If that is the case, the DOJ and Killebrew need to give the city’s police reform advocates more than lip service and do the job of going to court to hold APD and the city accountable for its intentional conduct of undermining and disobeying a court order.

After the December 16 and February 9 hearings, it’ s clear that the Department of Justice will not take any action to hold the city and APD accountable with contempt of court actions nor ask for the appointment of a receiver to take over APD. Federal District Judge James Browning has made it clear in 3 separate hearings that the court will not take any action unless specifically requested and agreed to by the City and the Department of Justice. Judge Browning needs to reconsider, otherwise things will only remain the same or perhaps continue to get worse.

It obvious the DOJ does not have the stomach nor does it want to do any of the heavy lifting when it comes to the reforms. The DOJ prefers to rely on the Federal Monitor as the lightning rod and prefers stipulated agreements with the city to settle any differences they may have with the city and APD, even when they have more than enough evidence that will support a contempt of court action. The DOJ is no longer cutting it and APD police oversight advocates know it and want and are demanding more from the court and the DOJ. It was the APD police reform advocates that worked to bring the DOJ to the city in the first place after far too many shootings.

The biggest complaint of all the DOJ consent decrees in the country is implementation and enforcement “go on and on” for years, costing millions in taxpayer dollars. That is exactly what is happening in Albuquerque, and will continue to do so unless the Federal Court puts the brakes on it. The single most remarkable understatement made during a status conference hearing a few years ago by Special Counsel for the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division Paul Killebrew was when he said:

“APD has proven over and over again its agility to avoid the requirements of the CASA.”

WHERE THERE IS A WILL TO OBSTRUCT, THERE IS A WAY TO OBSTRUCT

Given what Mayor Tim Keller, CAO Sarita Nair, City Attorney Esteban Aguilar and APD Chief Harold Medina have now said about the 14th Federal Monitors report it is abundantly clear they are now engaged in joint efforts with the police union favoring “noncompliance” and obstruction tactics.

Where there is a will to obstruct the CASA reforms, the Mayor, the City, APD management and the Police Union will likely find a way. The DOJ have failed to learn that lesson after 7 years and millions spent on the reform effort. The Federal Monitoring Team after over 7 years know without any doubt what needs to be done with use of force investigation and knows where things are lacking. The 300 plus page audits covering each time the 271 reforms and the Monitor always have the same old refrain “it’s not my job” to manage.

Review of all the Federal Independent Monitors Reports and reforms implemented, one conclusion is the spirit and intent of the settlement has been achieved with new “use of force” and “use of deadly force” policies, extensive training and sweeping mandated changes to APD protocols. Still, APD hovers at around 60% “operational compliance” when 95% is required for two years to dismiss the DOJ consent decree.

AS GOOD AS IT’S GOING TO GET

After 7 years and millions spent, it is likely things are as good as its going to get with the Keller Administration’s current APD management under the consent decree. Now that Keller has been elected to a second term, he and his minions feel free to challenge the need for the consent decree and to criticize the monitor’s findings. The is a far cry from 4 years ago when Keller said he was fully committed to police reform. Keller campaigned and was elected in part promising to implement the DOJ consent decree reforms, proclaiming his administration “owned it” and he would be judged on his success or failure. Keller now has “buyer’s remorse” when it comes to the CASA reforms, but he still owns it.

It is painfully obvious from review of all the monitor’s reports that APD’s high command appointed by Mayor Tim Keller cannot get the job done to the satisfaction of the federal monitor and the DOJ. The Federal Monitor has said that in order to effectuate real change within APD, and outsider Chief who fully understands constitutional policing practices needs to appointed. Mayor Keller has now twice refused to appoint a Chief from the outside preferring to appoint Chief’s and Deputy Chief’s who have retired from APD. Mayor Keller appointed Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs who have been with APD for decades. They helped create, were aware of, participated in or did absolutely nothing to stop the “culture of aggression” and the excessive use of force and deadly force.

APPOINT A RECEIVER, DISMISS THE CASA

APD has now reached the point with all its failures to implement the 271 reforms that the Department of Justice should seek Court Orders through a Motion For Contempt to hold the City and APD accountable. The DOJ should ask Judge Browning to appoint a receiver to get the job done to its satisfaction and let the DOJ do the heavy lifting for a change when it comes to the reforms. If the DOJ does not want to act, Judge Browning should act “sua sponte” and appoint a DOJ receiver to take over APD and set aside the CASA as unworkable or using his own term as “historical”.

Federal Monitor James Ginger at the conclusion of the February 9 hearing said that the 15th Monitor’s Report will be filed on May 11. It’s not at all likely that his findings of compliance will be any better or dramatically different that the past few reports.

Mayor Keller Writes Legislature Telling It Criminal Justice System Broken; Says “Public Safety Responsibility Of The State”; APD Fails To Do Job Of Arresting Felons, Misdemeanors And Cause Of DWI Dismissals

Mayor Tim Keller sent a letter in early February to all New Mexico Legislators during the 30 legislative session saying changes on the state level are necessary to get our crime crisis under control. He wrote asking for support of his “Metro Crime Initiative” legislation and asking legislators to step up their efforts and not “push this problem back to the Duke City.”

Keller wrote in pertinent part:

“… The state’s criminal justice system is fundamentally broken, and there is no single person or government that can fix it alone. Our State deserves more than another round of the blame game; we deserve and demand solutions. It is way past time for each piece of the system to take responsibility and agree that we each have to do our part to make it work.

That’s why … I convened the “Metro Crime” Initiative, bringing together leaders from across the criminal justice system, including legislators from both chambers. It produced 40 action items across jurisdictions to repair this failed system.

First, we must rebuild the dismantled behavioral health system. Second, we must close the revolving door by fully funding our courts at every level, and fixing the systems that are supposed to stop criminals from committing new crimes between arrest and conviction. Finally, we need to protect our communities from the epidemic of gun violence.

Today we are supporting a package of public safety legislation and investments that can help accomplish these Metro Crime Initiative guiding principles. I know it can be tempting to push this problem back to the Duke City. But our State is at its best when we step up to help each other.

… there is no excuse for ignoring the 900 thousand New Mexicans who call the Albuquerque metro area home. And the reality is that crime is not just an Albuquerque issue. Violent crime is indisputably a statewide problem with at least twenty communities in our state experiencing a rise of violence over the past decade.

The State is fundamentally responsible for key aspects of the criminal justice system, including defining which crimes we take seriously and funding the courts, the prosecutors, the public defenders, the detention centers, and behavioral health and addiction treatment. Albuquerque does not write its own criminal code or make rules for its judges. These are the areas where you can provide tangible, immediate help. There are many ways you can demonstrate action on crime this session.

New Mexico rises and falls with the Duke City, and today, we need your help. The larger issue for this session is not whether this particular measure will pass. It is not whether people can find reasons to stall various crime bills. It is not about commissioning studies or waiting for a longer session or more data to take action.”

Mayor Keller’s entire February, 2022 letter to the legislature can be found at this news source link:

https://www.krqe.com/news/politics-government/legislature/mayor-keller-urges-lawmakers-to-pass-crime-bills/

Mayor Keller in a separate interview said that lawmakers in rural areas do not see crime as their problem and said:

“I think that rhetoric has been really unfortunate. I think it has been damaging to our state.”

https://www.kob.com/albuquerque-news/one-week-left-to-get-key-public-safety-bills-through-new-mexico-legislature/6387362/

KELLER SUPPORTED PRETRIAL DETENTION LEGISLATION

One of the 40 action items identified by Keller’s “Metro Crime Initiative” is pretrial detention where a “rebuttable presumption of dangerousness” for defendants charged with certain violent crimes would be established for the courts. Under current state law, prosecutors are required to convince a judge in an evidentiary hearing that a charged defendant poses and immediate threat of violence to the public and to hold the defendant in jail until trial and not allow bond.

Rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of proof from state prosecutors, who must prove a case “beyond a reasonable doubt” to convict, to the defendant who would have to show they are not a danger to the public in order to be allowed to be released pending trial. As written the original bill was likely “unconstitutional” and violated the presumption of innocence until proven guilty guaranteed under the United States constitution.

On January 20, the Legislative Finance Committee (LFC) released a 14-page memo analysis of the proposed “rebuttable presumption of violence” system and pretrial detention. LFC analysts found that low arrest, prosecution and conviction rates have more to do with rising violent crime rates than releasing defendants who are awaiting trial. The LFC report called into serious question if violent crime will be brought down by using a violent criminal charge to determine whether to keep someone accused of a crime in jail pending trial.

According to the LFC report, rebuttable presumption is a values-based approach, not an evidence-based one.” The LFC report said that while crime rates have increased, arrests and convictions have not. The LFC went on to say the promise of “swift and certain” justice has a more significant impact on crime rates that rebuttable presumption does not.

The link to a related blog article is here:

https://www.petedinelli.com/2022/01/24/legislative-finance-committee-report-pretrial-detention-does-not-lower-crime-arrest-prosecution-and-sentencing-lowers-crime/

On February 7, the bipartisan Senate Bill 189 on “Pre-Trial Detention” was tabled on an 5-3 vote in the Senate Health and Public Affairs Committee, preventing the bill from moving forward in the Senate chamber essentially killing the legislation

APD MOST COMMON REASONS DWI CASES DISMISSED

On February 8, KRQE News 13 investigation reported on the most common reasons DWI cases are being dismissed in Bernalillo County. According to data compiled by the Bernalillo County District Attorney’s Office between 2018 and 2020, a police officer’s failure to follow through was all too often the likely reason for a case getting thrown out of court.

In the last three years hundreds of accused drunk drivers have had their cases dismissed essentially on technicalities caused by law enforcement of the prosecution. According to the report:

“In 2018, the Albuquerque Police Department, Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office and New Mexico State Police caught 2,521 people driving drunk. By 2020, because of the pandemic, bar closures and continued police officer shortages, the number of DWI arrests plummeted by more than 600.”

KRQE obtained the Bernalillo County DA’s Officer’s data that broke down the reasons why a case is dismissed. The data places blame on police officers. Depending on the police agency and the year, up to 77% of dismissals were attributed to the arresting officer failing to follow through on the case.

Judges assigned the cases must follow the law and the rules of criminal procedure and are required to dismiss a case if an officer doesn’t complete a pre-trial interview, turn over evidence to the defense or fails to show up to court.

Bernalillo County Deputy District Attorney Joshua Boone, the main DWI prosecutor at the DA’s office had this to say:

“It’s frustrating! If I lose cases on the merits because somebody is found to be not guilty or acquitted on a charge, I can always live with that. Losing cases on technicalities that’s a problem for me. … If we get a case where discovery has been turned over, the officers have conducted their interviews and they show up to court, we’re convicting at about an 89% rate. … We don’t lose those cases.”

The link to the full KRQE report is here:

https://www.krqe.com/news/investigations/data-officers-to-blame-for-dwi-case-dismissals/?ipid=promo-link-block1

KELLER’S METRO CRIME INITIATIVE

It was on September 23, that Mayor Keller concluded a conference he dubbed the “Metro Crime Initiative”. Participants included APD, the DA’s Office, the Courts and many other stakeholders to address what all participants labelled the “broken criminal justice” system and calling it a “revolving door”.

The entire “Metro Crime Initiative” started with the phony premise that our criminal justice system is broken. It’s not. The criminal justice is only as good as the stakeholders who are responsible to make it work and succeed. The 3 main components of the criminal justice system are law enforcement, prosecution and the courts. Examination of all 3 reflects failure to do their jobs.

When you examine the “check list” of the 40 different proposals that were the result of the Metro Crime Initiative, the proposals are essentially what all the participants have been working on over the past 2 years and include many programs already announced. The list contains nothing new. The items listed are ones that the participants should have been doing in the first place.

The 40 proposals are essentially an admission by many of the participants that they have not been doing their jobs effectively from the get go. There really is nothing new other than a public relations flyer and the checklist Mayor Tim Keller could hold up during his press conference and be able to say “ignore my failures of the past 4 years and see what I have done now to combat violent crime.”

KELLER’S APD NOT DOING ITS JOB

APD statistics for the budget years of 2019 and 2020 reflect that APD is not doing its job of investigating and arresting people. APD felony arrests went down from 2019 to 2020 by 39.51%, going down from 10,945 to 6,621. Misdemeanor arrests went down by 15% going down from 19,440 to 16,520. DWI arrests went down from 1,788 in 2019 to 1,230 in 2020, down 26%. The total number of all arrests went down from 32,173 in 2019 to 24,371 in 2020 or by 25%. Bookings at the jail have plummeted from 38,349 in 2010 to 17,734 in 2020. To have booking, there must be arrests. APD’s homicide unit has an anemic clearance rate of 36%.

THE PROSECUTION

When Raul Torrez ran for DA the first time, he said our criminal justice system was broken. Torrez accused the District Courts of being responsible for the rise in crime and releasing violent offenders pending trial. Torrez accused defense attorneys of “gaming the system” to get cases dismissed against their clients. A report to the Supreme Court prepared by the District Court revealed it is the DA’s office dismissing more felony cases for various reasons than the courts. The DA’s office currently has the highest voluntary dismissal rate in its history, and plea agreements with low penalties are the norm. Data given to the Supreme Court revealed overcharging and a failure to screen cases by the DA’s Office contributes to a combined 65% mistrial, acquittal and dismissal rate.

THE COURTS

A negative perception of the courts is created when judges release violent felons and not holding them for trial without bond. It’s common knowledge that Judges are concerned about their disqualification rates, appeals and reversals and how they are perceived by the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission. Judges are reluctant to make decisions and hold off on making the hard decisions to avoid controversy to protect their jobs.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

The participants in Mayor Tim Keller’s “Metro Crime Initiative” know what is wrong with the state’s criminal justice system. It is not a “broken system” but a “systems failure” caused by their own failures to act and to do their jobs effectively. The problems and shortcomings within our criminal justice system will not ever go away unless and until the stakeholders do their own jobs in an effective and competent manner.

The criminal justice system in this country and this state has never been perfect, nor will it ever be, but it is not broken. The criminal justice system does have its flaws and a number of inequities, but to say that it is a broken system is just plain ignorance or political opportunism at its worst.

A CONDECENDING LETTER

Keller’s letter to the New Mexico legislature has an unmistakable level of condescension of a big city attitude that results in the city being vilified by smaller rural communities. New Mexico doe not “rise and fall with the Duke City” as Keller suggests, nor is our “state’s criminal justice system fundamentally broken.” Further, our constitutional rights of presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt should never be sacrificed because prosecutors, and for that matter Mayor’s like Tim Keller and legislator’s, want to look good and be able to say they are bringing down crime.

Prosecutors like DA Raul Torrez are also lazy not wanting to do their own jobs but instead rely on a system to hold people pending trial and forcing them to begin a criminal sentence when they ultimately may be found not guilty or a case is dismissed with a District Attorney saying “never mind”.

Mayor Tim Keller’s letter, for all of its good intentions, can be held up as a good example as to why no Mayor of Albuquerque since Clyde Tingley in 1934 has gone on to become New Mexico Governor. Big city Pete Domenici was honorary Mayor of Albuquerque as Chairman of the City Commission and ran for Governor only to be defeated by small town Stanly, New Mexico Democrat Governor Bruce King.

Next time Mayor Tim Keller writes a letter to the New Mexico legislature regarding the failure of the criminal justice system, or to chide what he feels is rhetoric from smaller communities as “unfortunate and damaging to our state,” he may want to make sure that his own law enforcement agency is carrying its own weight and doing its job. Otherwise his own ambitions to becoming Governor will fail.

Are APD Reforms Working? : Two ABQ Journal Guest Columns Say NO; APD Has Bloated Overpaid Command Staff With 1 to 4 Ratio; Second Chance Keller Needs To Reset APD And DOJ Reforms

On February 10, 2022, the Albuquerque Journal published the two below guest columns under the caption “ARE APD REFORMS WORKING? The answer appear to be NO.

HEADLINE: Keller squanders opportunity to push accountability – again

BY PETE DINELLI / ALBUQUERQUE RESIDENT
PUBLISHED: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10TH, 2022 AT 12:02AM
UPDATED: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10TH, 2022 AT 12:15AM

The Mayor Tim Keller administration’s new negotiated contract with the police union is another lost opportunity to reform the Albuquerque Police Department and implement the DOJ reforms under the settlement. No doubt the union is ecstatic, given the fact that the Keller administration did exactly what it did four years ago: it caved into union demands, giving the union all the pay increases it demanded. The new negotiated contract makes APD the best-paid law enforcement agency in the region by increasing hourly pay by 8% and longevity pay by 5%, and creating a whole new category of incentive pay. There are no meaningful provisions to prevent overtime time abuse or fraud, which has plagued the department for 10 years.

Under state labor law, management is not allowed to join unions. The new union contract again allows APD management positions of sergeants and lieutenants to be police union members, violating state law. The police union is a party to the federal settlement case. The union has obstructed the implementation of the mandated reforms. The federal monitor has repeatedly found it is sergeants and lieutenants who are resisting management’s implementation of the DOJ reforms. Sergeants and lieutenants should have been removed from the bargaining unit and made at-will.

The Keller administration failed to get concessions from the union on police misconduct accountability.

Three provisions not included and opposed by the union were in the new contract:

• The contract provision barring the city’s Civilian Police Oversight Agency (CPOA) board members from knowing the names of officers investigated by the agency. This provision undermines the purpose and intent of the CPOA to identify sworn officers who have a history of misconduct and who should be disciplined or terminated.

• The union contract requires that the name(s) of the person(s) who complained about them is/are disclosed to officers under investigation. This provision was in the old contract. Allowing identification of complainants who choose to remain anonymous discourages the filing of civilian complaints for fear of retaliation.

• Police oversight advocates, such as APD Forward, wanted to increase the amount of time for the city to complete police misconduct cases. Under the previous contract, 90 days for police misconduct investigations with an optional 30-day extension with the police chief’s approval, was provided.
However, in practice, the 90 days is not sufficient.

The police union bluntly said it was not interested at all in extending the timelines for investigations. The reason for that is that the union, and its minions of sergeants and lieutenants know that the shorter the time taken to investigate misconduct cases likely means there will be no disciplinary action. The union goal is to avoid any disciplinary action at all cost and ignore the truth of police misconduct.

In his latest report, the federal monitor found 667 uninvestigated use-of-force cases. All non-force-related misconduct investigations completed by APD were found to be deficient. Approximately 83% of the cases were time-barred for discipline in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement should misconduct be found.

Keller was given a second chance when he was reelected to reform APD and implement the APD settlement agreement reforms. With the new union contract, he has essentially capitulated and, once again, given in to all union demands, squandering an opportunity to reform APD.

The link to the Albuquerque Journal Guest Column is here:

https://www.abqjournal.com/2468825/keller-squanders-opportunity-to-push-accountability-151-again.html

HEADLINE: Civilian police oversight failed in mentally ill man’s shooting

BY JIM LARSON / FORMER SECRET SERVICE AGENT; FORMER DALLAS POLICE OFFICER; FORMER MEMBER, CIVILIAN POLICE OVERSIGHT AGENCY; ALBUQUERQUE RESIDENT

PUBLISHED: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10TH, 2022 AT 12:02AM
UPDATED: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10TH, 2022 AT 12:15AM

On Dec. 9, 2021, the Civilian Police Oversight Agency (CPOA) had four vacant positions on its nine-member board. The remaining five members reviewed the details of an officer-involved shooting in Case No. 20-0044826. The board member presenting the case stated it should be tabled if all members were unable to review the documents. Two of the five board members reported they did not review the documents; one had viewed a video only.

Incomprehensibly, presentation of the case proceeded, and, with only three board members having access to the APD documents, all five members voted unanimously to accept APD’s investigative conclusions.
On June 4, 2020, Michael Mitnik called 911 to get help for his son, Max, who struggled with mental illness and was off his medication. Max wanted to go to the hospital, but not with his parents. Max’s father specifically requested that a Crisis Intervention Team respond. APD dispatched two Enhanced Crisis Intervention Trained (ECIT) officers.

One officer shot Max twice, once to his head. Max Mitnik survived, but not without life-altering traumatic brain injury and permanent disability. See civil filing D-202-CV-2022-0086.

In its review of the case, the CPOA Board opined there were numerous errors with APD’s response. For example, the ECIT officers failed to adequately grasp the nature or seriousness of the call. The officers did not gather and act upon information from family members. They did not control the scene, handcuffing and uncuffing Max, not searching him for weapons, and allowing him to return inside the home unescorted. The officers did not consider suicide a concern despite dispatch references to Max’s prior self-harm behavior. Although Max initially agreed to go to UNMH, the ECIT officers escalated the situation by discouraging his decisions, claiming extensive wait time at UNMH sitting in the police car, handcuffed, and unable to go to the bathroom.

The board members questioned how APD determines the minimum amount of force necessary, and why in this case less-lethal options were not more fully considered or discussed. Despite these questions and their own unease, the board members did not fault the shooting given the circumstances immediately preceding the shooting.

If the ECIT officers had followed the most basic policy and procedures, Max would not have been shot. According to the Force Review Board jeopardy began upon arrival and mistakes made caused this shooting and the fact the officer did not recognize the mistakes is terribly concerning. Despite the grievous failures, reliable sources report the shooter received an eight-hour suspension. Both officers got a letter of reprimand for policy violations and were to receive additional training. The CPOA Board avoided discussing the officers’ disciplinary history and, significantly, the appropriateness of this discipline.

The CPOA is statutorily required to review investigations of officer-involved shootings, make findings for each, and make them available to the public on the CPOA website. No such report has been published.

The board groused that more should be done to avoid these mental health catastrophes but did not consider further inquiry or potential corrective actions. Considering yet another example of the board’s understaffed, incomplete review of this case along with its failure to make and publish the required report of its findings, a reconceptualizing of this problem-ridden and ineffective civilian oversight process is urgent.

The link to the Albuquerque Journal Guest Column is here:

https://www.abqjournal.com/2468822/civilian-police-oversight-failed-in-mentally-ill-mans-shooting.html

BLOATED OVERPAID COMMAND STAFF VERSUS CRISIS OF “NO BOOTS ON THE GROUND”

During the last 4 years, the APD high command that works directly out of the Chief’s Office went from 4 to 10 full time sworn staff. Those positions are Chief, Superintendent Of Police Reform, Deputy Superintendent Of Police Reform, 6 Deputy Chiefs, 1 Chief of Staff. Within the last year, APD has created 16 new positions of “Deputy Commanders”.

Over the last 4 years, APD sworn went from 836 sworn officers to 917 sworn officers, an increase of 81 by last count. APD Chief staffing and mid management stand at 193 and are bloated and overpaid as follows:

1 APD Chief: $177,562 (not including recent raise of at least 6%)
1 Superintendent Of Police Reform , vacancy advertised at $155,000 to $185,000.
1 Deputy Superintendent Of Police Reform: $147,444 to $150,000.
6 Deputy Chiefs, paid between $144,228 to $149,881
1 Chief of Staff paid $149,881
12 Commanders: each paid $116,000 to $120,000
14 Deputy Commanders: each paid $100,000 to $115,000
44 Lieutenants: each paid $94,348 under new union contract
113 Sergeants: each paid $82,533 under new union contract

TOTAL: 193

The link to a related blog article is here:

https://www.petedinelli.com/2022/01/03/top-heavy-apd-high-command-staff-goes-from-3-to-6-deputies-with-5-apd-insiders-new-level-of-apd-bureaucracy-created-with-16-deputy-commander-positions-outsiders-needed-to/

RANK AND FILE PAY

“Rank and File” police officers are generally recognized as sworn police officers under the rank of sergeant. These are the sworn police officers that do the heavy lifting of police work responding to 911 calls for service and who patrol the streets of the city. Following is what rank and file sworn officers are paid:

Police Officer 1/C (first class) with 2 TO 4 YEAR SERVICE under new contract goes from $60,320 TO $68,411.20 a year.

Pay for Senior Police Officer 1/c (first class) with 5 To 14 YEAR SERVICE under new contract goes from $62,400 to $70,761 a year.

Pay for a Master Police Officer 1/c (first class) with 15 years and above of service goes FROM $65,520 TO $74,297 A YEAR.

APS sworn qualify for longevity pay in their fifth year of service. Under the new contract terms, longevity pay starts at $2,730 per year and increases topping of at $16,380 annually for those who have served 17 or more years.

The link to a related blog article on the new union contract is here:

https://www.petedinelli.com/2022/02/07/city-apd-union-negotiate-new-contract-keller-squanders-another-opportunity-for-apd-police-reform-hourly-pay-increased-8-longevity-pay-increased-5-new-incentive-pay-created-ov/

CRISIS OF LACK OF “BOOTS ON THE GROUND”

On February 8, Chief Harold Medina reported to the Albuquerque City Council that APD has 514 field services personnel. What this means is that 514 sworn police officers are assigned to the 6 area commands, and those assigned to the 6 area commands are then divided to cover the 3 separate shifts of daytime, nighttime and graveyard.

Simple math should reveal that with 514 field service officers, 86 field officers are assigned to the 6 area commands and those 86 are then divided by 3 shifts for 28 to cover an area command that are available to patrol the streets. But that is not how it works.

The number of officers patrolling the streets in the area commands are reduced significantly for any number of reasons. Officers are also assigned to units within the area command, area command desk jobs including detective work and investigations work and officers may be in court, on vacation, on sick leave or on military duty leave. APD also makes assignments to area commands according to 911 call volumes.

The number of sworn officer patrolling streets and neighborhoods are dangerously low. The reality is that APD has a mere 4 to 6 sworn police officers patrolling the streets in each area command during any given shift and the number goes down dramatically during low volume 911 call times.

The crisis of “lack of boots on the ground” was made crystal clear on Thursday, August 19, 2021 when 4 Albuquerque Police Officers were seriously injured following a shooting in northeast Albuquerque. The shooting happened as officers responded to a robbery by the Dutch Bros. near Mountain and Juan Tabo. It turns out that only 5 sworn officers were on duty in the area command when the incident happened and they had no backup they could call on for help.

A link to a related blog article is here:

https://www.petedinelli.com/2021/08/20/officer-down-1-apd-officer-in-critical-condition-3-officers-wounded-2-suspects-arrested-with-1-injured-man-charged-with-felonies-chief-medina-blames-justice-system-union-blame/

APD MANAGEMENT TO RANK AND FILE RATIO IS 1 TO 4, NOT INCLUDING CHAIN OF COMMAND

One good indicator of just how top heavy APD has become with management positions is the calculation of the number of management positions to rank and file positions.

There are 724 sworn police officers that can be considered “rank an file”. That figure is derived by taking the total number of APD sworn of 917 and subtracting the total number of management positions of 193 from the ranks of sergeants to Chief to arrive at 724, (917 sworn – 193 management = 724 rank file.)

The ratio of APD management to employee is 1 to 4. The ratio is calculated by dividing the 724 employee position by the 193 management positions resulting in 1 manager to every 3.7 employees or a 1 to 4 ratio of management positions to employee positions.

APD is a para military organization and as such it has a chain of command. A chain of command dictates that you must add each level of command above each level of rank and file. Therefor, the lower an officer is in the chain of command, the more management levels can dictate orders and instructions. The chain of command creates a significantly higher ratio of management to employee depending on the tasks assigned to rank and file employees.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

On November 2, 2021 Mayor Tim Keller was elected to a second term even though he broke his promises to increase APD to 1,200 sworn officers, bring down crime rates and failed to implement the APD consent decree reforms.

Mayor Keller has been given a second act. Keller must get done what needs to be done with APD and the DOJ consent decree in his first year of his second term. Otherwise, APD will continue to spiral out of control, the DOJ remains and crime will continue to rise.

Keller should concentrate on four major areas during the first year of his second term:

1. Replace APD Chief Harold Medina, Reduce Deputy Chiefs By 3, Cut Command Staff Abolishing Deputy Commander Positions, Reorganize APD, Solve “Boots On The Ground” Crisis With More Field Service Personnel

It was during an April 15, 2020 hearing when Federal Judge Browning questioned Federal Monitor Ginger what his thoughts were on the appointment of Chief Harold Medina as the new APD Chief. Dr. Ginger thought then, as now, that APD needs an “external chief” or an “outsider” and in his words someone “nationally” with experience in DOJ reforms. Ginger expressed the opinion that such an outside person was needed to “effectuate real change” within APD.

During the December 16, 2021 hearing on the 14th Federal Monitor’s report, Judge Browning asked Ginger “how deep are the leadership problems at APD” and what can be done to solve those problems. Ginger’s response was blunt when stated the problems with APD are “failed leadership”.

According to Ginger the only thing that is going to change things and stop what is going on at APD is removing the existing leadership. Ginger told Judge Browning the leadership problems start from the top executive team and goes down through management to the rank file. Ginger testified that 80% of the issues APD is still faced with in the CASA can be dealt with by a change in leadership.

Keller should thank Chief Harold Medina and his appointed 6 Deputy Chiefs for their service and tell them it is time for them to move on as he did with former Chief Michael Geier. Keller needs to replace the entire APD Chief High command and conduct a national search to find a new police chief or for that matter a Superintendent of Police who has actual experience in managing a troubled police department and experience implementing department of justice reforms and allow that person to hire their own management team.

For decades, APD high command has consisted of 1 Chief and 3 Deputy Chiefs and it should be returned to those levels. It is clear that APD command staff is top heavy going from 4 to 10 and needs to be streamlined. The 16 “Deputy Commander” positions creates a whole new level of bureaucracy and management between Commanders and Lieutenants that is highly questionable as to duties and responsibilities other than “assisting” commanders.

Keller should replace the entire APD high command, cut management positions and assign more sworn to field services to solve the “boots on the ground” crisis.

2. RENEGOTIATE POLICE UNION CONTRACT TO EXCLUDE APD MANAGEMENT:

Under state labor law, management are not allowed to join unions. The current police union contract allows the APD management positions of sergeants and lieutenants to be police union members violating state law. The police union is a party to the federal settlement case. The union has obstructed the implementation of the mandated reforms. The Federal Monitor has repeatedly found it’s sergeants and lieutenants who are resisting management’s implementation of the DOJ reforms. They need to be removed from the bargaining unit and made at will.

3. CREATE APD SALARY STRUCTURE, ABOLISH OVERTIME AND LONGEVITY PAY

APD officers are paid hourly for a 40-hour work week, paid time and a half overtime and longevity bonuses for years of service. 160 sworn police are consistently in the top 250 paid city hall employees and paid well over $100,00O a year. A salary structure of steps and grades must be implemented to abolish overtime and abolish longevity pay. $30,000 sign on bonuses to new cadets with a 6-year commitment is necessary to attract a younger generation of police officer.

4. SEEK DISMISSAL OF CONSENT DECREE OR ASK FOR RECEIVERSHIP

Review of all 14 Federal Independent Monitors Reports and reforms implemented, one conclusion is the spirit and intent of the settlement has been achieved with new “use of force” and “use of deadly force” policies, extensive training and sweeping mandated changes to APD protocols.

Still, APD hovers at around 60% “operational compliance” when 95% is required to dismiss the DOJ consent decree. After 7 years and millions spent, it’s likely things are as good as its going to get with current management under the consent decree. It’s time to ask the court to dismiss the case or appoint a receiver and let the Department of Justice do the heavy lifting for the first time in 7 years and reform APD to its satisfaction with 100% implementation of the 271 reforms it has mandated under the consent decree.

FINAL COMMENTARY

Second chances in politics because of weak opposition are very few and far between. Tim Keller has had a very charmed political career always being able to prevail against very weak candidates when he ran first for State Senate, then State Auditor and then for a second term as Mayor.

Keller has now been given a second chance. Only time will tell if Keller has learned anything in office over the last four years other than how to do photo ops, do press conferences, attend heavy metal concerts to introduce the band and act like a high school jock living his old glory days as quarterback.

If Keller fails to act now when it comes to APD he will waste his second chance to make any difference reforming APD.

A link to a related blog article is here:

Second Chance Keller: First Year Of Second Term Time To Reset APD And Deal With DOJ Consent Decree

Former Assistant City Attorney And Lead Counsel In CASA Settlement Reprimanded By NM Supreme Court; No Disciplinary Action By Federal Court; Gave Appearance To Federal Court Still Working For City 2 Years After Departure; Criticized Federal Monitor’s Practices Requiring City To Disavow; Truth Of Accusations Unknown And Ostensibly Ignored By DOJ

On February 9, The New Mexico Bar Bulletin, the official publication of the New Mexico Bar Bulletin, Volume 61, No. 3, on page 17, published the following formal reprimand of JEREMY SCHMEHL, Esq.:

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO IN THE MATTER OF JEREMY SCHMEHL, ESQ.

Disciplinary No. 2021-07-4498 An Attorney Licensed to Practice Law before the Courts of the State of New Mexico: FORMAL REPRIMAND

“You are being issued this Formal Reprimand pursuant to a Conditional Agreement Admitting the Allegations and Consent to Discipline, which was approved by a Disciplinary Board Hearing Committee and a Disciplinary Board Panel.

You were employed by the City of Albuquerque’s legal department as an assistant City Attorney from August 6, 2016, to April 12, 2019. You served as lead counsel for the City in a high-profile federal court case which has a consent agreement.

You advised the City on a wide range of matters related to the City’s obligations pursuant to the consent agreement.

On April 29 and May 4, 2021, you sent email correspondence to the presiding judge in the case (community members may submit letters), without the prior knowledge or consent of the City.

The emails contain your personal opinions; criticisms of an individual who is tasked with monitoring compliance with the consent agreement; and are replete with references to your work while employed with the City.

You thus conveyed the appearance that you were speaking on behalf of the City, which was decidedly not the case, requiring the City to take actions to disavow your communications.

You have been forthright and cooperative in the disciplinary process and have expressed genuine remorse—all mitigating factors.

We are confident that you have learned from the experience: a positive outcome of the disciplinary process.

Your conduct violated Rule 16-106(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, by revealing information to the representation of a client without the client’s informed consent.

You are hereby formally reprimanded for these acts of misconduct pursuant to Rule 17-206(A)(5) of the Rules Governing Discipline.

The formal reprimand will be filed with the Supreme Court in accordance with 17-206(D) and will remain part of your permanent records with the Disciplinary Board, where it may be revealed upon any inquiry to the Board concerning any discipline ever imposed against you.

In addition, in accordance with Rule 17- 206(D), the entire text of this formal reprimand will be published in the State Bar of New Mexico Bar Bulletin. Dated January 21, 2022.”

The Disciplinary Board of the New Mexico Supreme Court
Hon. Cynthia A. Fry (ret’d), Board Chair

CORRESPONDENCE THAT FORMED BASIS OF DICIPLENARY ACTION

Disciplinary actions against attorneys are long and draw out process and are very serious and can result in reprimands, suspension or disbarment of an attorney from the practice of law. The proceedings are strictly confidential. The complaints filed and those who make a referral or who file the complaints are also confidential.

Notwithstanding the confidentiality of the disciplinary action against JEREMY SCHMEHL, anyone who deals with the City Attorney’s office and who has knowledge of the federal Court Approved Settlement Agreement (CASA) and the Federal Monitor is capable of determining that the case involved is The United States of America v. The City of Albuquerque, 1:14-cv-01025-JB-SMV. All emails, letters and correspondence in the case received and reviewed by the federal court are docketed and made a matter of public record.

It has been determined by review of the federal docket, the documents filed in the case United States of America v. The City of Albuquerque, Case 1:14-CV-01025-JB-SMV, Documents 805 and 809, are what the formal reprimand of JEREMY SCHMEHL is based upon and that they are emails and letters that have been docketed in the case. The emails can be found in the postscript to this blog article.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

The communications sent to the federal court by attorney JEREMY SCHMEHL were sent a full two years after he left his city employment. The accusations made JEREMY SCHMEHL against the Federal Monitor James Ginger are inflammatory and very serious. There are no pleading or documents on file responding to the accusations. The accusations have never been fully responded to in an open court proceeding by the City, the Department of Justice, the Third-Party Intervenor Police Union nor the Federal Court Appointed Monitor yet remain part of the record.

It can only be speculated as to the who and why the matter was referred to the New Mexico State Bar Disciplinary Board for disciplinary action without first seeking sanctions or contempt of court before the Federal Court to whom the representations were made or the striking of the emails and letters from the court docket.

Additionally, the emails and letters sent to Federal Judge Browning by attorney JEREMY SCHMEHL were cited and relied upon by the Amicus McClendon sub-class as evidence that the APD police union was aggressively undermining CASA reforms and seeking that the police union be held in contempt of court. The police union saw the problem with the SCHMEHL letter, and contacted him demanding clarification to the court that he was not representing them. The Amicus McClendon sub-class letter can also be found in the postscript to this blog article.

What is disappointing is that the Department of Justice (DOJ) ostensibly may not understand, do not care or simply choose to ignore, the seriousness of the accusations made against the federal monitor. Otherwise they would have sought to determine why the letter was sent in the first place and indeed if the SCHMEHL correspondence was part of the police unions efforts to undermine the CASA, in which case the DOJ should have sought contempt of court of the police union and the removal of the union as a party to the case.

_________________________

POSTSCRIPT

Following are the emails from Jeramy Schmehl to Judge Browning dated April 29, 2021 and May 4, 2021.

Editing was done with the addition of bracketed topics to assist the reader.

From: Jeramy Schmehl [PRIVATE EMAIL ADRESS REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2021 5:02 PM
To: NM Dml_Judge Browning’s Chambers [Email address redacted]

Subject: The United States of America v. The City of Albuquerque: Unexplained and Unconsidered Methodological Flaws in the Approach to Monitoring Reform of the Albuquerque Police Department

The Honorable James Oren Browning
U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico
[PHSICAL ADDRESS REDACTED

Re: The United States of America v. The City of Albuquerque 1:14-cv-01025-JB-SMV

Dear Judge Browning,

I write to Your Honor as a member of the Albuquerque community having witnessed years of effort to reform the Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”) and its policies, training, and operations into a model of constitutional policing. My perspective is defined by being an attorney having spent the bulk of my legal career defending hundreds of indigent criminal defendants in San Antonio, Texas and here in Albuquerque. I am also father to two young children and husband to an Albuquerque native with a vested interest in seeing APD become the most effective version of itself.

I also consider that my view of the police reform project is an informed one because I served in the City of Albuquerque’s (“City”) Legal Department as an Assistant City Attorney dealing solely with the City’s effort to comport with the Court Approved Settlement Agreement (“CASA”) with the United States of America (collectively “the Parties”). I worked in this role from August 2016 to April 2019. During that time, I provided daily assistance to APD personnel in meeting the requirements of the CASA as scrutinized by the Independent Monitor through policy, training, and operational refinement of the Department. I also assisted the City in drafting revisions to the First Amended and Restated CASA to entail a three-level force reporting system, with the Internal Affairs-Force Division (“IAFD”) and field supervisors reviewing and investigating Level l, 2 and 3 force applications.

When I left the City, I was working most closely with the newly created IAFD as it developed and refined the approach and systems to investigate use of force incidents. I spent many hours interacting with swom personnel, the Independent Monitor and attorneys working with the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division-Special Litigation Section (“USDOJ-Special Litig.”). I now work in a regional law firm practicing civil defense and I also represent individual APD officers in administrative and criminal investigations.

I understand that the Independent Monitor’s Thirteenth Report (“IMR-13”) is soon to be filed with the Court, and I hope that this letter will assist Your Honor in appreciating the reliability of this Report as it assesses the City’s attainment of compliance with the CASA. This letter will explain the methodological deficiencies I perceive to exist in the approach to monitoring the Albuquerque police reform project. I viewed these concerns when I was working on the project and believe that, while there is robust documentation and discussion of the faults and failings of APD personnel, there has never been thoughtful dialogue or even meaningful comprehension of the process by which the Independent Monitor is determining compliance with the CASA.

It is notable that there has never been any probative consideration of the accuracy of reporting by the Independent Monitor, especially since there are important foundational documents explaining and delineating the monitoring process, i.e., the Monitor’s Proposal, the Methodology (or “Monitor’s Manual”), and certain CASA related Paragraphs.

1. The Independent Monitor’s Proposal to the City and USDOJ Civil Rights-Special Litigation Section (“Proposal”).

This document was submitted by Public Management Resources, Inc. (“PMR”) to the USDOJ-Special Litig. and the City in response to the Parties request for information from individuals (and teams) wanting to be considered for the role of independent monitor for Albuquerque’s police reform project. See, “Response to Request for Information, City of Albuquerque and the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division-Special Litigation Section, by Public Management Resources, Inc.”, December 12, 2014 at https://wwwjustice.sov/usaondlfilel76426lldovtnload, hereinafter referred to as “Exhibit A”.

While the Proposal has never been incorporated into the CASA, reading this document, one should expect that the “three overriding principles” of monitored reform were intended by the Independent Monitor to influence the expectations and trajectory of the reform effort

(l) consensus around measurable and quantifiable objective outcomes;

(2) a monitoring process that is clear and definable; and

(3) ample opportunity to review draft Independent Monitor’s Reports (“IMR”) leads to gain full investment in a “consensus-based” and “data-based” final product.

See, Exhibit A, pg. 1. The Independent Monitor considers the vetting of draft reports (3) as how Your Honor and the community should expect to receive the “most accurate, realistic and meaningful report possible”. Id. pg. 3.

2. Dr. Ginger’s Monitoring Methodology.

As required by the CASA, and anticipated by the Proposal, the Independent Monitor created the monitoring Methodology as a paragraph-by-paragraph quantitative and qualitative description of compliance with corresponding data sources to assess the same. See, “Appendix One (Methodology) to Monitor’s First Report, Compliance Levels of the Albuquerque Police Department and the City of Albuquerque with Requirements of the Court Approved Settlement Agreement”, November23,2015; see also, Exhibit A,pg2.

On July 30, 2019, the Parties filed a Second Amended and Restated Court Approved Settlement Agreement, by which wholesale changes were made to the previous use of force reporting and investigation construct of APD. See, Doc. 465 (delineating the amendments to the First Amended and Restated Court Approved Settlement Agreement); see also Doc 465-1. With this filing, the Parties defined use of force along a continuum of 1-3 while also expressing that the Force Investigation Section within IAFD would conduct Level 2 and Level 3 force investigations, and supervisors are to review Level 1 force applications. See, Doc. 465-1, paragraphs 48(a)-(c), paragraphs 50-59 and paragraphs 60-77.

The Methodology has not been amended by the Independent Monitor to reflect these drastic changes to the police reform project, and no representative of an Amici group, lawyer for the City, or lawyer for USDOJ-Special Litig. has ever raised this as an apparent concern in using this tool to continue measuring the attainment of compliance with the CASA. Despite this shortcoming, and in the face of the CASA amendments nearly two years ago, the Independent Monitor continues to cite to and purportedly apply the obsolete Methodology as the means to measure compliance.

3. CASA Paragraphs 300(a) & (b).

As part of the monitoring and reporting expectations of the CASA, and within three months of his appointment, the Independent Monitor should have provided the City “a methodology for reviewing serious use of force investigations,” as well as “clearly delineating the requirements of this Agreement to be assessed for compliance, indicating which requirements will be assessed together”. (see, CASA, paragraph 300(a) and (b).

[FEDERAL MONITOR FAILS TO MET REQUIREMENTS]

I understand that the Independent Monitor has never met either of the noted requirements, and this impacts the ability for Your Honor to understand the cascading impact of certain paragraphs falling out of compliance. The utility of explaining a methodology for assessing any use of force investigation cannot be overstated given that “[y]ou can’t get anyone to agree about any of this”, and recent tumult across the country relative to police use of force exemplifies that an independent monitor of a police reform effort must be able to lend definition and veracity to a method assessing use of force incidents. Without this guidance, assessment of use of force investigations is undefined, arbitrary, and seemingly without a discernible end to criticism. Thus, the importance of a clear, understandable, and consensus-based methodology for reviewing use of force investigations cannot be overstated in the context of this project.

Each of these provisions must intend to give shape to the contours of effective reform that is identifiable to Your Honor, APD and the community. However, and as discussed more fully below, the Independent Monitor fails to live up to the expectations of the Proposal, the Methodology, and the CASA with each IMR filed with the Court and reported to the community. What was intended to be a consensus driven, transparent and clear process, by the Independent Monitor’s own definition, has become an amorphous and rudderless police reform project.

It may be that the random nature of the monitoring process should have been apparent to anyone reading the Independent Monitor’s First Report, when despite the Independent Monitor appending a Methodology comprised of almost purely quantitative measures of compliance, and pledging allegiance to it as the rubric by which to measure reform, the following definition of “operational compliance” was spelled out for the first time:

“Operational Compliance: Operational compliance is attained at the point that the adherence to policies is apparent [emphasis added] in the day-to-day operation of the agency, e.g., line personnel are routinely [emphasis added] held accountable for compliance, not by the monitoring staff, but by their sergeants, and sergeants are routinely [emphasis added] held accountable for compliance by their lieutenants and command staff. In other words, the APD “owns” [emphasis added] and enforces [emphasis added] its policies.”

This language is not in the Methodology, the CASA, or any other formative document related to the police reform effort, because such subjective, non-quantitative rhetoric is like saying, “I know it when I see it”. Such an undefined supposition of “operational compliance” is eerily akin to the Supreme Court fumbling to define obscenity; however, this definition is unanticipated by the Methodology, antithetical to the Proposal, and it should not suffice to be the measure to assess APD’s attainment of constitutional policing. Even further, without the Independent Monitor supplying a transparent, clear, and consensus-based definition of compliance, the City, APD, and the community may never see an end to a police reform effort that is growing increasingly like an experiment gone awry.

I. The Independent Monitor’s Proposal to the City.

In the Proposal, the Independent Monitor laid out the foundational expectations for the Parties and a community considering the appropriate trajectory of a police reform effort. The Independent Monitor explained these characteristics to be

(1) consensus around outcomes,
(2) a clear, definable, and quantifiable monitoring process and
(3) the full investment of the Parties through independent monitoring reports that are vetted through the Parties to provide the Court the “best evidence practicable”. See, Exhibit A, pg. 3. An IMR is how the Independent Monitor reports to the community and the Court on progress made by the City and APD in achieving the ends of the CASA.

The Proposal expected the Independent Monitor to engage in a process that involves vetting of draft IMR by the Parties:

“Draft reports will be submitted to the parties in sufficient time to permit review, identification of potential inaccuracies or methodological problems, and to resolve those issues in joint discussion among the monitoring team, the management staff of APD and members of the Justice Department’s legal team working the APD decree. Only after the report has been vetted in this matter (sic) will it be submitted to the Court, ensuring the Court and the public have the most accurate, realistic, and meaningful report possible.” Id.

[WHAT WITNESSED AS CITY ATTORNEY]

The process I witnessed as an attorney with the City did not reflect the promises of the Proposal, and the impacts of deviating from the approach of gaining buy-in for each IMR, as a known best practice, are becoming more readily apparent across APD in each day that passes. This language also intimates that the Parties should have already raised the clear “methodological problem” in using an inapplicable Methodology to support compliance findings across several IMR published to the Court and community long ago. The Parties are either frightened, confused by the reform process, too disinterested, or too politically leveraged to challenge the obvious issue raised by such a foundational and self-evident “methodological problem” of using a Methodology that is nearly two years expired.

A. Errors and Omissions, Cut-and-Paste Criticisms, and the Unseen Cost.

The need to vet an IMR with the Parties is self-evident to the Independent Monitor because it is unfair to expect that reasonable minds will never differ and given the mass of data assessed through the police reform effort there must be mistakes, misstatements and disagreement. The razor thin margin for disagreement is most evident when considering that a finding in a use of force investigation is to be supported by a preponderance of evidence, i.e., a greater than fifty percent (50%) evidentiary showing that an event is in/out of policy. Where only one side of a use of force incident is depicted in an IMR, it is therefore only natural to expect that APD personnel will disagree with the assessment and can provide that additional one percentage point to support an investigative finding.

[NO OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE, ONE SIDED REFORM EFFORT]

Yet, as one peruses an IMR, there is no point-by-point summation of evidence supporting any finding by the Independent Monitor relative to a particular use of force event, and there is no indication that Department personnel were afforded any opportunity to refute the Independent Monitor’s depiction of evidence. Instead, the evidence is presented through a perfunctory and one-sided exposition of the facts leading up to an incident followed by an Independent Monitor finding that a use of force is out of policy. A reader must be left to wonder why APD personnel are never given an opportunity to explain their one percent (1%) of disagreement with these findings. I do not doubt that APD personnel disagree with the depiction of evidence relative to use of force incidents from past IMR. Because only the Independent Monitor’s perspective of evidence is ever published to the community and Your Honor, the monitored reform effort cannot be described as anything other than one sided, an inapposite approach given the Proposal.

[NO QUID PRO QUO DIALOGUE]

In my nearly three years of being involved in the project, I never once witnessed the Independent Monitor engage in a quid pro quo dialogue, or any meaningful discussion with the Parties about the substantive accuracy of any content in a draft IMR. Instead of a quantitative effort akin to a social science analysis (and as expected from the Methodology), the Independent Monitor’s report writing style is far from objective or collaborative, and it has consistently involved lobbing attacks on every echelon of APD personnel.

[CLEVERLY COUCHED VITRIOLIC LANGUAGE]

The surplusage of cleverly couched vitriolic language, packed to the gunnels with exclamation marks and pointed attacks on the Force Review Board, personnel in IAFD, and command staff in IMR-12 must naturally place many of these folks in fear of losing their jobs. I appreciate that the media has been questioning the cost of the police reform effort from a dollar spent perspective, but I consider that the true impact of this style of report writing is felt by APD personnel subject to constant, unquestioned, and highly personal criticism. Combine this with policing one of the most dangerous communities in the country, and it takes no leap of faith to appreciate why officers are transferring out of APD or retiring early.

1. What is the organizational impact of a reporting style that uses exclamation points, repetition of negative findings and one-sided case snippets to update the public on the reform effort? Do not sworn and civilian employees become demoralized by the tone of such reporting so many years into a reform effort?

2. The Independent Monitor sets out case synopses of force incidents, but when drawing conclusions that a particular use of force is out of policy there is no clear delineation of the evidence indicating how a preponderance of evidence standard has been met to say an incident is out of policy. Given that a difference in finding a force incident in or out of policy may be as little as one percent (l%), how is this approach fair or transparent?

3. What if APD can explain the one percentage point supporting their perspective that a particular use of force is in policy? Will this police reform effort be held up by a single use of force case where the Independent Monitor is the only one to be heard about the impropriety of one force application?

4. What if APD misses reporting a single Level 1 use of force incident because an investigation finds that the interaction was meant to guide, assist, or control an individual, i.e., “not a use of force”? Will disagreement over a Level 1 use of force be used to withhold compliance from APD and the City?

5. Does the City have an opportunity to vet the IMR before they are published? If so, is there an ability to object to Dr. Ginger’s tone and repetitively negative approach in reporting on deficiencies? Does this vetting by the City really amount to spotting “errors and omissions”, akin to raising concern over typos and/or misspellings?

6. Is there evidence (or a consensus among sworn and civilian personnel) that the Independent Monitor’s approach to reporting and the reform effort more generally, are leading to officer attrition either through retirement or seeking work elsewhere? Isn’t this an obvious side-effect of a monitoring process that at this point has become so redundantly negative?

7. Is there agreement between the Independent Monitor, the City and DOJ around each IMR before one is published? If not, why not? The Proposal anticipated consensus building, clarity, and transparency around the monitoring process and IMR findings. If there is disagreement, and an IMR is published unilaterally by the Independent Monitor, aren’t these aspirations difficult, if not impossible to achieve?

8. Can the USDOJ-Special Litig. point to another police reform effort with independent monitor reports that are similarly repetitive of negative findings and/or that use exclamatory statements? What is the process to “vet” and file independent monitor’s reports in other police reform projects?

9. Does the Independent Monitor find it helpful to the reform effort to repeat negative findings about issues such as use of force, training, failed executive leadership or some other CASA concern? Is this the best practice in monitoring police reform? Is this what the Independent Monitor did on the Pittsburgh and New Jersey projects to achieve success? If so, and this is the best practice, why does it work?

10. If an IMR is not vetted with buy-in from the Parties, then how is it to be considered factually complete and accurate enough to submit to the Court as evidence?

11. Why can’t the Parties begin vetting each IMR from this point in the reform effort from now until compliance is achieved? Where there is disagreement on a particular Independent Monitor finding, by USDOJ-Special Litig., or the City, wouldn’t it be most helpful for that Party to file an objection or otherwise be heard by the Court?

12. Is the scope of an IMR necessarily meant to entail the collection, assessment and reporting on data gathered in a reporting period? If so, why do IMR veer off the path into subject areas that have nothing to do with attaining compliance, i.e., “duty of care” and issues with the former Chief of Police as discussed repetitively in IMR-12? Don’t such targeted attacks amount to ultimatums for APD to discipline or terminate personnel that may simply be expressing a differing opinion of a use of force incident or other Departmental concern?

[CUT AND PASTE MONITOR REPORTS]

When I worked on the reform project, we performed a quick analysis of an IMR with the goal of determining how much of it was original material, i.e., not repeated several times within the document. We found the Independent Monitor’s reporting style to involve cutting and pasting large swaths of verbiage across multiple other sections in a Report. This cut-and-paste style can also be appreciated from one IMR to the next. The Independent Monitor also cuts and pastes the CASA into every IMR. By doing these things, the Independent Monitor makes an IMR appear to be a mighty tome, when really, each one could be one-third to one-half as long. Through this approach, the Independent Monitor tends to magnify areas of concern by repeating negative observations of APD in an IMR.

[ERROSION OF TRUST]

The Independent Monitor coined the term “counter-CASA” to be indicative of behaviors by officers meant to undermine the police reform effort. I suggest that the Independent Monitor’s caustic, one-sided, and beyond reproach report writing style over the years stands as the exemplar of behavior eroding trust that this reform process is in any way even handed. This erosion of trust is particularly clear when the City and APD lack the ability to challenge erroneous or unfair language found in an IMR. I believe that the cost of the Independent Monitor’s report writing style is immeasurable to the community and APD, as it degrades officer morale and any belief that the reform effort is at all fair, or that it will ever end.

II. The Independent Monitor’s Methodology.

The consensus around outcomes anticipated by the Proposal was supposed to be embodied in the Methodology initially reviewed and commented on by the Parties before it was filed with the Court. The Methodology was meant to identify each CASA required task while also expressing the Parties’ stipulation as to how to assess compliance. The Independent Monitor’s Methodology is a three hundred plus page table indicating data sources, and compliance definitions while specifying whether a particular CASA provision is subject to quantitative or qualitative measurement. For instance, the Methodology establishes that ninety five percent (95%) of outcomes pertinent to an incident, i.e., use of force, must be in line with policy/training for a specific paragraph of the CASA to reach compliance. In the Proposal, the Independent Monitor indicated that assessing compliance was to be primarily a quantitative endeavor, and the Methodology seemingly bears forth this expectation. See, Exhibit A,pg.2.

[OUTDATED METHODOLOGY]

While the Proposal and Methodology are meant to combine into a transparent, easily quantified, and clear monitoring process, one may see that the monitoring of APD’s compliance with the CASA is arbitrary, not explained through quantitative measures, and based on a Methodology that is no longer relevant to the project at hand. This last point is particularly evident given that the Independent Monitor has not amended the Methodology despite wholesale amendments to the CASA taking effect nearly two years ago, whereby APD migrated to a three-tier use of force definitional construct and force investigations being conducted by field supervisors and Force Investigation Section personnel.

Setting aside the obvious methodological deficit in the Independent Monitor purporting to apply a Methodology that is outdated and therefore inapplicable, I view the Independent Monitor’s approach of writing on use of force investigation issues that are wholly irrelevant to policy and training to exemplify another means by which to diminish the fairness of the monitoring process. It seems that the Independent Monitor, in each IMR, casts down new expectations on personnel reviewing and investigating use of force incidents that seem untethered to policy, training, or the Methodology.

1. How can the Independent Monitor continue monitoring this police reform effort based on a Methodology that does not reflect the realities of APD’s changed policy and training relative to use of force reporting and investigations?

2. Why hasn’t the City or USDOJ-Special Litig. raised the apparent issue with the Independent Monitor continuing to use a dated Methodology to assess APD’s operations and performance relative to the CASA?

3. How can APD personnel or the community trust the reliability of a police reform effort that has been touted as transparent, consensus-based, and clear if the Methodology upon which compliance is to be assessed is not even reflective of the CASA?

4. Do the City and USDOJ-Special Litig. understand the role the Methodology is to serve in assessing APD’s compliance with the CASA? If they do, are they concerned with the fact that the Methodology was never changed to reflect the fundamental rewrite of the CASA, while the Independent Monitor continued to promulgate Reports assessing compliance?

5. Do the Amici and various other stakeholders understand that several IMR have been written and delivered to them as valid, quantitative measures of compliance while also appreciating that the Methodology underpinning these Reports is wrong? If they recognized this issue, why have they not raised it to the Court? If they think this is an unimportant issue, or a distinction without a meaningful impact, why is this the case?

6. Shouldn’t the Independent Monitor immediately amend the Methodology and reconsider or amend vast swaths of previous IMR that were written based on the incorrect Methodology? How can the Independent Monitor explain the validity of these past IMR (those published after the amendments to the CASA) given that they are based on an incorrect Methodology?

7. Is there any explanation that can be given to justiff the flawed method in writing several IMR, and presenting them to the Court and community as accurate when the Methodology used to do so is no longer applicable?

8. The Independent Monitor has never explained why ninety five percent (95%) as a quantitative measure, is appropriately applied to use of force investigations or any number of human performance-based tasks called for by the CASA. Is this metric used in other areas of social science assessment of human performance, and more importantly why is it appropriately applied to policing, which on a dayto-day basis in Albuquerque may involve life and death decision making?

9. Can the Independent Monitor direct Your Honor and the community to literature indicating that ninety five percent (95%) is an appropriate measure to be applied in this police reform effort? And, aside from the Independent Monitor’s other projects, when has another independent monitor of a police reform project applied ninety five percent (95%) as the appropriate standard to achieve compliance with either a court approved settlement agreement or consent decree? How long did those projects last?

III. Reviewing Serious Use of Force Investigations and the Interrelationship of CASA Paragraphs.

[SIX YEARS OF FAILURE TO EXPLAIN METHODOLOGY]

The Independent Monitor has also failed, for about six years, to explain to the Court, community, and the Parties the methodology to be used in reviewing serious use of force investigations and explaining paragraphs of the CASA to be assessed together for compliance.
See, CASA, paragraphs 300(a)-(b). This first requirement is important because as I learned in my time working on the police reform project, and in the context of assessing use of force incidents- “[y]ou can’t get anyone to agree on any of this”. A member of the USDOJ-Special Litig. conveyed this wisdom to me as we sat with two members of the Independent Monitoring Team (“IMT”) and members of IAFD during a site visit to assess several use of force investigations involving electronic control weapon (“ECW” or taser) applications. I recall the broad strokes of that use of force incident as follows.

[CASE IN POINT]

On one night two APD officers responded to an individual trespassing near the entryway of a bank. The individual had created a makeshift sleeping shelter in the alcove of the bank. The APD officers told the individual that he needed to leave the area as he was not supposed to be on the premises after bank hours. The individual refused, and during the interaction it became plain that he may be armed as he continued to disobey commands to remove his hands from his pockets. Seeing that the individual remained non-compliant and there was probable cause to arrest for a criminal offense, one of the officers radioed for additional assistance. At least one other officer showed up and the three officers continued to give him verbal commands that he was under arrest and to remove his hands from his pockets. The individual refused and a taser was successfully deployed and the individual was arrested. I recall taking issue with the fact that the officers did not give the individual a verbal warning that he was going to be tased, as was required by APD policy.

I also recall this being a topic of conversation with IAFD personnel as we readied for the meeting with the IMT. I sat through the meeting, expecting the IMT to point out this obvious failure to meet APD policy, and it never happened. I raised this to the IMT by asking if the failure to warn prior to the ECW application was a concern. I was told by them that this failure to warn was not a concern and that they also found the tasing of the passively resistant individual to be within APD policy and training. I appreciated that, as an intermediate force option, tasers allow officers the opportunity to address potentially armed individuals without the need to use physical force. It is, after all, unreasonable and unsafe for an officer to come closer to an individual believed to be armed with a knife, which would increase the risk of harm to the officer and individual.

It was at the point of the IMT not finding the obvious policy violation that I leaned back in my chair into the direction of a member of USDOJ-Special Litig., asking-“[w]hat was that, he didn’t provide a verbal warning? That should be a policy violation.” The attorney responded with “[y]ou can’t get anyone to agree about any of this”. It is in this context that I point out the importance of the Independent Monitor explaining, after more than six years of police reform, the methodology for reviewing serious use of force incidents. While the phrase “serious use of force” is incongruent with the CASA’s three-tiered use of force reporting and investigation approach, I suggest that providing a methodology to bring some rhyme to the reason of reviewing all use of force investigations is long overdue. And while I was not privy to the original drafting of this CASA language, I believe that providing such an explanation would be in the spirit of the Independent Monitor’s aspiration to lend clarity, transparency and consensus building to the reform process.

1. What is the methodology for the Independent Monitor to assess any use of force investigation? The reader of an IMR can see that tangential issues are beginning to take center stage, such as “target glancing”, “overstating charges”, “importance of offrcer reports vis a vis other evidence”, “duf of care” issues, “the role of lapel footage in assessing force incidents”, and myriad other concerns, some of which are not clearly raised by the CASA, APD policy, or APD training. Because there is not a use of force methodology, the definition of Operational Compliance is so subject, and no quantitative Methodology is being applied, no reader can appreciate whether these concerns are becoming part of the compliance equation. As such, it seems very possible that IMR after IMR, new issues raised with new concerns could elongate the monitoring process without end.

2. Without a methodology to review serious use of force investigations (or any force investigation), how can APD ever be expected to meet the seemingly undefined standard of compliance relative to these investigations? Without a defined methodology, doesn’t this mean that for the last six plus years the Independent Monitor has been applying a fluid, undefined, and unagreed upon approach to reviewing these investigations?

How is such an approach fair to APD, and how can it be considered clear, transparent, and based on the consensus of the Parties?

CASA Paragraph 300(a) requires the Independent Monitor to have explained the paragraphs assessed for compliance together. Because this information has never been provided, a reader of an IMR is left to guess how and why large sections of the CASA shift in and out of primary, secondary, and operational compliance together. Much like the failure to update the Methodology, the failure to explain the foundational interrelationship of paragraphs assessed for compliance together serves as another way that this police reform effort may drone on without end.

The scenarios of interrelated compliance determinations in the CASA are limitless given that the reform effort involves two hundred and seventy-six (276) individual requirements pertaining to virtually every facet of APD operations. This is even further complicated because policy, training and operations are assessed for compliance in an amorphous fashion by the Independent Monitor, and in a way that has never been explained to the reader of an IMR. The consequence of this deficiency is that no one can really appreciate why from IMR-toIMR compliance levels rise and fall in what one can only hope is a well-reasoned and fair fashion. The Independent Monitor may contend that these interrelationships are intuitive, therefore, no explanation is needed. I contend that this reform effort has become anything but intuitive, and the Parties were correct in including this directive to have such interdependencies delineated and explained.

[CONCLUSION]

I hope that the foregoing is an aid to Your Honor as you continue presiding over this matter. I agree with the Independent Monitor that police reform is complex in nature and further appreciate that this complexity comes from the revision of policy and training to inculcate a new pattern of behavior in a police organization. I also believe that the most important complexity of a police reform effort is to constantly consider the cause and effect of these changes and the approach to monitoring on APD personnel in the field, investigating burglaries, investigating use of force, homicides and the myriad other permutations of crime that exist in Albuquerque. Because when a police reform effort such as this one is tethered by a monitoring process that is ill-defined, arbitrary to the point of being capricious, and biting in a reporting tone that is personal, one must ask if it is doing anything more than causing collateral damage.

Kind regards,
Jeramy I. Schmehl

Four days later, a follow up email letter was sent to Judge Browning

From: Jeramy Schmehl [PRIVATE EMAIL ADRESS REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday May 4 , 2021 4:28 PM
To: NM Dml_Judge Browning’s Chambers [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED]

Subject: followup The United States of America v. The City of Albuquerque: Unexplained and Unconsidered Methodological Flaws in the Approach to Monitoring Reform of the Albuquerque Police Department

Dear Judge Browning,

Earlier today I forwarded my correspondence delivered to you on April 29,2021 to the Parties and Independent Monitor as I considered my failure to do so an oversight. As a result of my letter being sent to the Parties, I received a telephone call from the Albuquerque Police Officers Association (“APOA”) indicating that it viewed a deficiency in my depiction of work being performed on behalf of police officers of the Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”). To be clear, I represent APD officers in criminal and administrative investigations and my legal fees are paid by the APOA through dues paid by member officers.

I do not represent the APOA in this matter and I received letter I wrote to you last week. The opinions expressed in personal knowledge.
Kind regards,
Jeramy I. Schmehl

AMICUS MCCLENDON SUB-CLASS MAKE REFERENCE TO SCHMEHL CORRESPONDENCE AS EVIDENCE OF POLICE UNION AGGRESSIVELY UNDERMINING CASA REFORMS

On June 3, 2021, the Amicus Mcclendon Sub-class submitted to the Federal Court a second letter for consideration during the June 9 hearing. The June 3, letter published here deletes addresses, references to court documents, case citations and adds caption edits in brackets [ ]. The editing was done to assist and clarify the letter for all none lawyers who read this blog. Following is the letter:

June 3, 2021
Honorable James O. Browning
[Address redacted for privacy]

Re: United States v. City of Albuquerque No. 1:14-cv-1025-JB-SMV

Dear Judge Browning:

We are writing to Your Honor on behalf of the Plaintiff-Intervenor subclass in McClendon, et al. v. City of Albuquerque, et al. Civ. No. 95-24 JAP/KBM, one of the amici in the above-captioned case, to urge the Court to promptly address the inappropriate activities of the Albuquerque Police Officers’ Association (APOA) that are undermining compliance with the Court’s orders.

After we submitted the McClendon amicus’ May 26, 2021 letter, we read the two emails that were sent to Your Honor by Mr. Jeramy Schmehl, an attorney who represents APD officers “in criminal and administrative investigations” and whose fees “are paid by the APOA through dues paid by member officers” Those emails (the first of which was sent to the Court on April 29th ex parte) attack the Court’s Independent Monitor and the entire implementation process, and fit within the context of the APOA’s campaign to sabotage implementation of the Court’s orders, so require a response.

The APOA argued in its December 19, 2014 Motion To Intervene (MTI) that “its participation will contribute to the equitable resolution of this conflict.” Moreover, after the APOA was granted party status, the APOA has concurred in several motions asking the Court to modify the CASA. The APOA also signed the amended versions of the CASA and Second Amended CASA . Those court-approved settlement agreements which the APOA signed contain, inter alia, these provisions: “The Parties commit to working together to implement this Agreement.” and “The Parties agree to defend the provisions of this Agreement.” It appears that the APOA is violating both of those provisions and is also working in concert with other persons to persuade elected City officials to attempt to abrogate the CASA that the APOA signed.

Sadly, it now seems clear that, contrary to their assertions to the Court when seeking intervention and to the representations made to the Court by its counsel, and in direct contravention of the requirements of [the settlement agreement] the APOA is indisputably not contributing to the equitable resolution of this case. Rather, the APOA is actively and aggressively undermining the efforts by the Court’s Independent Monitor, the United States, and the City of Albuquerque to implement the CASA. The APOA’s actions violate the APOA’s duty as a signatory to the current version of the CASA to make good faith efforts to implement the extant settlement agreement; an agreement which the APOA signed and also asked the Court to enter as a federal consent decree.

[THE APOA IS ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNING]

1. The APOA is actively campaigning to get City officials to abrogate the commitments embodied in the CASA. As the Court is likely aware, an April 26, 2021 story in the Albuquerque Journal regarding the APOA’s “Crime Matters More” campaign, stated the following:

The Albuquerque Police Officers’ Association has launched a campaign urging the public to tell city leaders that “crime matters more” and that “they want to focus on the growing crime problem, instead of wasting millions of dollars on endless Department of Justice oversight.”

The APOA’s campaign cost $70,000 and involves billboards around the city and testimonials on TV, radio and social media from former Albuquerque Police Department officers “explaining how hard it is to just succeed,” said Shaun Willoughby, the union’s president. The push includes providing an email template for people to tell city leaders they believe in police reform and think APD has made progress but they are “tired of living in a city filled with murder, theft and violence.” “I’m urging you to fight for this city, stand up to the DOJ, and help us save the city we love, before it’s too late,” the template states.

Much of Willoughby’s ire seemed directed at the city attorneys – “you don’t need enemies when you have friends like the city attorney” – who he said aren’t supporting officers at the federal court hearings held periodically throughout the year. “We believe that our community deserves better from this police department,” he said. “We believe our community deserves better from this consent decree process.”

https://www.abqjournal.com/2384284/apd-union-launches-campaign-against-dojoversight.html

In addition, the APOA’s President, Mr. Willoughby, stated on April 26, 2021 to KOB-TV, “You can either have compliance with DOJ reforms or you can have lower crime. You can’t have both; and we think it’s time that our city leaders hear from the actual community that crime matters more because it does.”
https://www.kob.com/new-mexico-news/albuquerque-police-union-starts-campaign-to-pushback-against-doj-requirements/6087348/

[APOA ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE STOPPED PARTICIPATING IN GOOD FAITH]

2. The APOA also appears to have stopped participating in good faith in some of the processes designed to bring about compliance with the CASA. When attending the May 26th pre-hearing meeting with the parties that Judge Brack directed the parties and the amici to conduct prior to the court hearings during which the Independent Monitor’s reports are discussed with the Court, it was learned that the APOA is no longer participating in the process established by Judge Brack.

It is our impression that the APOA is also not participating meaningfully in the regularly scheduled meetings that the other parties have been holding for years with the Court’s Independent Monitor to attempt to improve compliance. Those failures to “work together to implement” the CASA impede compliance and should be remedied.

In Clearone Communs., Inc. v. Chiang, … the court held, “In civil contempt proceedings, disobedience of the order need not be willful. Rather, “[a] district court is justified in adjudging a person to be in civil contempt for failure to be reasonably diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what was ordered.”

[In a 1998] case involving a union that attempted to thwart the purpose of a consent decree, the court held:

Consent decrees are subject to continuing supervision and enforcement by the Court. ” ‘[A] court has an affirmative duty to protect the integrity of its decree. This duty arises where the performance of one party threatens to frustrate the purpose of the decree. … it is not necessary to find that the defendants willfully violated the consent decree in order to hold them in contempt. “

… .
[In the case of In EEOC v. Local 580], the goal of the consent decree was to increase minority and female employment in the Times’s bargaining unit and in the Casual labor force. The practices of the defendants have had an adverse effect on this goal, and the Court has the power to take any steps necessary to counteract and compensate for the adverse effect on minority and female hiring within the four corners of the consent decree. … .

It is evident that the APOA and its lawyers are not just failing to be reasonably diligent in attempting to accomplish what they agreed must be done and what they asked the court to adopt as an order of the Court, but APOA’s actions are indisputably having an adverse effect on the central goal of the litigation; eliminating the endemic pattern and practice of using force unnecessarily and excessively and eliminating the culture of aggression that pervades the APD.

Moreover, the Court does not need to hold the APOA in contempt in order to sanction actions by APOA officials and representatives that undermine implementation of the CASA. Citing Hutto v. Finney, … (1978), the Supreme Court has held that a federal court may sanction a party without necessarily holding them in contempt, “when a party ‘shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order. … The imposition of sanctions in this instance transcends a court’s equitable power concerning relations between the parties and reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself, thus . . . “vindicating judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court” …

[SABOTAGING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSENT DECREE]

Accordingly, we urge the Court to both vindicate the authority and integrity of the federal judiciary and to protect the CASA and the people of Albuquerque who are the CASA’s beneficiaries, by sanctioning the APOA for its actions. Whether the Court convenes a show cause hearing to determine if the APOA’s actions constitute contempt of court, or imposes other consequences on the APOA for sabotaging implementation of the consent decree, we respectfully request that the Court take prompt action to “counteract and compensate for” the APOA’s actions that threaten to thwart the purpose of the orders that the APOA asked the Court to enter in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter Cubra
Counsel for McClendon Amici

Governor MLG’s 2022 Legislative Agenda Dies In Committee; Pre-Trial Detention, Hydro Energy Bill Die In Committee; Election Code Changes On Life Support; Governor Lujan Grisham Has Forgotten How To Add And Subtract In An Election Year

On January 18, the 2022 New Mexico legislature convened for its 30 day legislative sessions known as the “short session” and it ends on February 17. Thirty-day sessions are dedicated to enactment of the annual budget and financial issues with the fiscal years beginning on July 1 and ending June 30. The agenda is also set by the Governor, referred to as the “Governor’s Call”, meaning the Governor dictates what additional legislation can be considered other than fiscal matters.

Governor Lujan Grisham placed 3 major legislative initiatives on the 2022 legislative agenda for consideration and enactment:

1. Pre Trial Detention
2. Hydrogen hub development act
3. Election law changes

With a mere 9 days left in the 2022 New Mexico Legislature 30 session, February 9 will go down as the date Governor Michell Lujan Grisham’s 2022 legislative agenda died and it was not at all a pretty happening while she is running for a second term.

PRETRIAL DETENTION

On February 7, the bipartisan Senate Bill 189 on “Pre Trial Detention” was tabled on an 5-3 vote in the Senate Health and Public Affairs Committee, preventing the bill from moving forward in the Seante chamber. An identical proposal is still pending the state House but is also getting significant resistance. With only 9 days left in the session, the vote makes it highly likely the legislation will ultimately fail to pass both chambers. The proposal was backed by Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, 2nd Judicial District Attorney Raúl Torrez and Albuquerque Mayor Tim Keller leaving all 3 of them looking somewhat foolish being unable to secure passage of the bill. Both Torrez and Keller went out of their way to testify in committees supporting the bill and lobby for passage.

Supporters of the bill, including families of those killed, said the legislation would be a commonsense step toward reducing crime. They argued it would keep dangerous offenders behind bars until trial and ensure they don’t commit new offenses. Opponents of the bill, especially the New Mexico Defense bar, challenged the the constitutionality of the proposal and said it would do little to reduce New Mexico’s violent crime rates.

Links to news sources are here:

https://www.krqe.com/news/politics-government/legislature/high-profile-pretrial-detention-proposal-moving-slowly/

https://www.abqjournal.com/2468188/pretrial-detention-bill-blocked-by-senate-committee.html

The pretrial detention bill would have created a “rebuttable presumption of dangerousness” for defendants charged with certain violent crimes. Under current state law, prosecutors are required to convince a judge in an evidentiary hearing that a charged defendant poses and immediate threat of violence to the public and to hold the defendant in jail until trial and not allow bond. The rebuttable presumption bill shifted the burden of proof from state prosecutors, who must prove a case “beyond a reasonable doubt” to convict, to the defendant who would have to show they are not a danger to the public in order to be allowed to be released pending trial. As written the bill was likely “unconstitutional” and violated the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

On January 20, the influential Legislative Finance Committee (LFC) released a 14-page memo analysis of the proposed “rebuttable presumption of violence” system and pretrial detention. LFC analysts found that low arrest, prosecution and conviction rates have more to do with rising violent crime rates than releasing defendants who are awaiting trial. The LFC report called into serious question if violent crime will be brought down by using a violent criminal charge to determine whether to keep someone accused of a crime in jail pending trial. According to the LFC report, rebuttable presumption is “a values-based approach, not an evidence-based one.” The LFC report said that while crime rates have increased, arrests and convictions have not. The LFC went on to say the promise of “swift and certain” justice has a more significant impact on crime rates that rebuttable presumption does not.

The link to a related blog article is here:

https://www.petedinelli.com/2022/01/24/legislative-finance-committee-report-pretrial-detention-does-not-lower-crime-arrest-prosecution-and-sentencing-lowers-crime/

HYDROGEN HUB DEVELOPMENT ACT

On February 7, Democrat New Mexico Speaker of the House Brian Egolf, D-Santa Fe, announced that a revived substitute Hydrogen Hub Development Act which was filed after the previous proposal stalled was withdrawn from an assigned House committee. No reason was given for the withdrawal. The original Hydrogen Hub Development Act was tabled on a bipartisan 6-4 vote last month in the House Energy, Environment and Natural Resources Committee. Democrat Representative Matthew McQueen, D-Galisteo, the chairman of the House Energy, Environment and Natural Resources Committee, said he was “very concerned” that the new bill was bypassing not only his committee but also another House panel the original bill had been assigned to.

With only 9 days left in the 30-day session, the withdrawal of the substitute bill likely means the legislation is dead in that it would still have to get through house committee hearings, pass the House and then referred to the Senate, get through Senate committee hearings and pass the full senate.

The link to quoted news source material is here:

https://www.abqjournal.com/2468170/revived-nm-hydrogen-bill-pulled-back-amid-criticism.html

The Hydrogen Hub Development Act would have created a legal framework for hydrogen energy development in the state. Lujan Grisham Administration government officials and the oil and gas industry argued that the development of the state’s hydrogen can provide a tool for the transition to a clean energy economy. Supporters argued that hydrogen has many potential applications as a relatively clean-burning fuel that doesn’t emit carbon dioxide. Governor Lujan Grisham promoted the bill as a way to significantly boost efforts to lower carbon emissions in New Mexico while at the same time creating a whole new industry that offers sustainable, high-paying jobs. Environmentalists strenuously spoke out against it, citing widespread fear that promoting and accelerating hydrogen development with government incentives would hurt, rather than help, state efforts to combat climate change. Environmentalists argue that large-scale hydrogen production would do little to lower carbon emissions, perhaps make them worse, because hydrogen is made with natural gas that has a huge amount of carbon dioxide.

The link to a related blog article is here:

https://www.petedinelli.com/2022/01/26/hydrogen-hub-development-act-introduced-the-pros-and-cons-consequences-of-getting-it-wrong-are-too-dire-hold-special-session-on-environmental-issues-and-hb4-or-hold-over-until/

VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION CODE CHANGES

Senate Bill 8 is a broad update of New Mexico’s election laws supported by Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, Secretary of State Maggie Toulouse Oliver and co-sponsored by Democrat Senate Majority Leader Peter Wirth of Santa Fe. Given the fact that only 9 days remain for enactment, its passage is now in real doubt.

On Monday February 7, Senate Bill 8 passed in its first Senate Committee hearing but it then was referred to yet another Senate committee for hearing. The Senate Rules Committee gave the bill a “do pass” recommendation on a 7 to 4 party line vote with Democrats in favor and Republicans opposed. It was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee to examine the question if it conflicts with the state Constitution as to registration to vote.

Senate Bill 8 must advance through two Senate committees and the full Senate before it is referred to the House. It would then have to pass House Committee hearings and pass the full House on or before February 17 before it is sent to the Governor for her signature.

Links to quoted news source material is here:

https://www.kob.com/new-mexico-news/voting-rights-bill-moves-forward-in-legislature/6384651/?cat=500

https://www.krqe.com/news/politics-government/legislature/nm-voting-rights-act-passes-senate-rules-committee/

https://www.abqjournal.com/2468151/nm-voting-bill-advances-through-1-committee-assigned-to-another.html

HIGHLIGHTS AND EXCLUSIONS OF SENATE BILL 8

Senate Bill 8 is an updating New Mexico election code and procedure laws. The major provisions of SB 6 can be summarized as follows:

Designating Election Day as a state holiday.

Establish a permanent absentee voter list, allowing people to sign up once to receive absentee ballots for statewide elections, rather than having to file a new application each time.

Automated voter registration at Motor Vehicle Division offices of citizens who are qualified to vote, but are not registered. People would be registered automatically when they complete a transaction at the Motor Vehicle Division or another state office, if they submit information showing they are qualified to vote.

Some 17-year-olds would be eligible to vote. 16-year-olds are no longer included in the bill, but 17-year-olds could vote in any election as long as they would be 18 by the next general election.

Restore the voting rights of felons who are no longer incarcerated. Convicted felons who have completed their prison sentence would be allowed to register to vote immediately after released from prison and will not have to wait until they complete probation an parole.

The link to news source material is here:

https://www.kob.com/new-mexico-news/voting-rights-bill-moves-forward-in-legislature/6384651/?cat=500

The link to a related blog article is here:

https://www.petedinelli.com/2022/01/28/senate-bill-6-election-law-changes-debated-republican-der-fuhrer-trump-party-chair-pierce-argues-damage-to-security-and-integrity-to-state-elections-without-any-evidence/

SENATE BILL 144 PASSES SENATE

Senate Bill 144, sponsored by Democratic Senator Katy Duhigg of Albuquerque, passed the Senate on a 38-0 vote sending it on to the House for consideration. It would add employees and agents of the secretary of state’s and county clerks’ offices to the New Mexico law making it a crime to intimidate election officials. The law would apply to threats intended to disrupt the impartial administration of an election. The impetus of the bill is that after the 2020 election, election officials reported racist mail, being followed and other threats. Secretary of State Maggie Toulouse Oliver was force to leave her home for weeks in 2020 for personal safety reasons after her personal information was published on a website called “Enemies of the People,” with targets over officials’ photos.

The link to quoted news source material is here:

https://www.abqjournal.com/2468151/nm-voting-bill-advances-through-1-committee-assigned-to-another.html

COMMENTARTY AND ANALYSIS

After being a member of the Bernalillo County Commission, the United States Congress as well as Governor of New Mexico for 3 full years, you would think that Governor Lujan Grisham would know how to count votes. The failure of all 3 initiatives can only be chalked up to her and her administration’s failure to lay the ground work to secure passage of her agenda. Instead, she relied way too much on public relations and presumed public support without giving much effort to secure the necessary votes for passage within both the New Mexico Senate and House.

The failure of Democratic Governor Lujan Grisham’s 2022 legislative agenda in a state legislature where both chambers are controlled by significant majorities of her own party can only be describe as embarrassing. 2022 is an election year and the Governor should consider herself lucky that she does not have a Democratic opponent for the June 6 primary.

The link to a related blog article on the candidates running in 2022 is here:

https://www.petedinelli.com/2022/02/03/candidates-for-state-and-federal-offices-file-to-run-in-june-6-primary-5-flawed-republican-candidates-for-governor-2022-election-officially-begins/

There is no doubt that those running for the Der Führer Trump Republican Party nomination for Governor will make a big deal out of her failure to get her anti-crime legislation agenda through the 2022 session. Very negative TV ads are already being aired demanding that the Governor stop releasing violent felons on the street and to stop the “revolving door”. Those Democrats also running for office will now also be facing the tired, worn-out false refrain by Der Führer Trump Republicans that Democrats are “soft on crime”.

Der Führer Trump Republicans will again falsely argue that New Mexico’s criminal justice system is broken when it is the stakeholders, law enforcement and prosecutors, such as the opportunistic DA Raul Torrez who is running for Attorney General, who are failing to do their jobs of making arrests, prosecuting and securing convictions. In Albuquerque, APD felony arrests went down from 2019 to 2020 by 39.51%, and the Bernalillo County District Attorneys office under Raul Torrez has a 65% combined mistrial, acquittal and dismissal rate.

Der Führer Trump Republicans always hate it when the United States constitution and the courts get in their way, especially when the lose elections and try to overthrow election results.

A link to a related Albuquerque Journal Guest Column is here

ABQ Journal Guest Column: “Criminal Justice System In Metro Is Not Broken”

City, APD Union Negotiate New Contract; Keller Squanders Another Opportunity For APD Police Reform; Hourly Pay Increased 8%; Longevity Pay Increased 5%; New “Incentive Pay” Created; Overtime Remains; Sergeants And Lieutenants Remain In Union; DOJ Accountability Provisions Excluded

EDITOR’S NOTE: This blog article is an in depth analysis of the new police union contract negotiated by the Mayor Tim Keller Administration.

Mayor Tim Keller’s administration has negotiated a new police union contract making APD the best paid law enforcement agency in the region by increasing hourly wages and longevity pay and creating a whole new category of “incentive pay”. Under the new contract, APD’s starting wage is well above cities and law enforcement agencies of comparable size including Tucson, Arizona, $54,517, and El Paso, Texas, $47,011. The new APD contract keeps APD starting wages slightly higher than the New Mexico State Police.

The 48-page APOA police “Collective Bargaining Agreement” (CBA) is for 1 year and 6 months period. It is effective January 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023. The new CBA can be down loaded as a PDF file at this link:

https://www.cabq.gov/humanresources/documents/apoa-jul-9-2016.pdf/view

Under the new contract terms, longevity pay increases by 5% starting on July 1, the beginning of the new fiscal year starting at $2,730 per year with those who have 5 years of service and with incremental service years up to 17 years or more who will be paid $16,380.

The new union contract continues to allow the management positions of sergeants and lieutenants to be union members. The new union contract contains no accountability provisions under the Department of Justice Court Approved Settlement Agreement (CASA). The settlement reforms have been resisted and opposed by the police union.

Police union rejected or resisted contract provisions include:

1. Not disclosing the identity of sworn police officers to the Police Oversight Commission that is investigating them.

2. Mandating the disclosures of the identity of those who file complaints against an officer.

3. Opposing the expansion of the amount of time to investigate police misconduct cases.

The city’s rank-and-file officers voted overwhelmingly to approve the contract and it is already in effect. City Council approval is a mere formality and is only to confirm funding availability.

The City Council is prohibited from being part of personnel negotiations but must vote to approve the contract only for purposes of funding it.

The link to related and quoted news coverage is here:

https://www.abqjournal.com/2467440/city-reaches-new-deal-with-police-union.html

APD BUDGET STAFF COVERED BY UNION CONTRACT

The police union had been at impasse with the previous Republican Administration for almost 8 years. In 2018, newly elected Mayor Tim Keller was able to negotiate a 2-year city contract with the Albuquerque Police Officers Association (APOA) for the time period of July 7, 2018 to June 30, 2020. The contract expired on July 1, 2020. Because of the pandemic the police union contract negotiations were suspended. Under the state “collective bargaining act”, and what is referred to as an “evergreen clause”, the terms and conditions of the two-year contract remained in force and effect until the new contract was negotiated.

Review of the APD budget and current staffing levels before review of the new union contract provisions is in order.

The Albuquerque Police Department (APD) is the largest budget department in the city. APD’s approved general fund operating 2022 budget is upwards of $222 million, or roughly 4.5% higher than fiscal year 2021 existing levels. Ultimately, the City Council approved nearly all the APD funding the Keller Administration requested in the budget proposal submitted on April 1, 2021. APD’s funding is for 1,100 sworn positions and 592 civilian support positions for a total of 1,692 full-time positions. It also includes funding for new positions, including 11 investigators to support internal affairs and the department’s reform obligations under the Federal Court Approved Settlement Agreement and two communications staffers. Notwithstanding being fully funded for 1,100 full time sworn police, APD has only 917 full time sworn officers.

On December 12, during a federal court hearing on the Department of Justice consent decree, APD reported that as of December 6, 2021 APD’s staffing levels are as follows

Full Sworn Officer Count: 917

1 APD Chief
1 Superintendent Of Police Reform
1 Deputy Superintendent Of Police Reform
6 Deputy Chiefs
1 Chief of Staff
12 Commanders
14 Deputy Commanders
44 Lieutenants
113 Sergeants
731 Patrol Officers
2 Sworn CSA’s

The positions of 44 Lieutenants, 113 Sergeants and 731 Patrol Officers, for a total of 888 staffing are all covered by the police union contract.

NEW HOURLY WAGE RATES

First year probationary officers are not covered by the union contract in that they are not union. Starting pay for an APD police officer graduating from the academy and for the officers first year of probation remains the same. They are paid $21.27 an hour for a 40-work week, 52 weeks a year or $44,241.60 yearly. The cost of training each APD cadet is upwards of $60,000. As it stands, there is no minimum commitment for a cadet to work for the city after graduation, meaning they could move on to another law enforcement agency their first year of employment with the city if they want.

“Rank and File” police officers are generally recognized as sworn police officers under the rank of sergeant. Under the union contract sergeant and lieutenants are allowed to join the police union.

“RANK AND FILE” HOURLY PAY

The normal workweek under the contract is defined as 40 hours comprised of either 5 eight hour or 4 ten-hour days. (Page 19 of contract)

Page 6 of the new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) outlines the new hourly wages negotiated for both rank and file officers and sergeants and lieutenants.

CLASSIFICATIONS

Under the union contract, the classification of Police Officer 1C is an officer in the bargaining unit who has completed probation up through 4 years of service as an APD Sworn Officer.

The classification of Senior Police Officer 1C is an officer in the bargaining unit with 5 through 14 years of service as an APD Sworn Officer.

The classification of Master Police Officer 1C is an officer in the bargaining unit with 15 or more years of service as an APD Sworn Officer.

The definition of serve and service is “actual time worked”.

2 TO 4 YEAR SERVICE PAY GOING FROM $60,320 TO $68,411.20 A YEAR

Hourly pay for a Police Officer 1/C (first class) after completing one year of probation and then up through 4 years with the department under the new contract goes from $29 and hour or $60,320 yearly to $31.32 an hour or $65,145.60 yearly until June 30, 2022, the end of the fiscal year. It then increases under the new contact to $32.89 and hour or $68,411.20 a year until the expiration of the union contract on June 30, 2023.

5 To 14 YEAR SERVICE PAY GOING FROM $62,400 TO $70,761 A YEAR

Hourly pay for a Senior Police Officer 1/c (first class) with 5 to 14 years of service goes under the new contract from $30 an hour or $62,400 a year to $32.40 an hour or $67,392 yearly until June 30, 2022, the end of the fiscal year. It then increases under the new contract to $34.02 an hour or $70,761.60 a year until the expiration of the union contract on June 30, 2023.

15 OR MORE YEARS SERVICE PAY GOING FROM $65,520 TO $74, 297 A YEAR

Hourly pay for a Master Police Officer 1/c (first class) with 15 years and above of service goes under the new contract from $31.50 an hour or $65,520 a year to $34.02 an hour or $70, 761.60 yearly until June 30, 2022, the end of the fiscal year. It then increases to $35.72 an hour or $74,297 a year under the new contract until the expiration of the union contract on June 30, 2023.

SARGEANT PAY GOING FROM $72,800 TO $82,533 A YEAR

From January 1, 2022 to June 30, 2022 hourly pay for APD Sergeants under the new contract goes from $35 an hour or $72,800 a year to $37.80 an hour or $78,624 until June 30, 2022, the end of the fiscal year. Pay for APD Sergeants under the new contract then increases from July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023 to $39.69 an hour or $82,555.20 a year until the expiration of the union contract on June 30, 2023.

LIEUTENANT PAY GOING FROM $83,200 TO $94,348 A YEAR

Hourly pay for Lieutenants goes under the new contract from $40 an hour or $83,200 yearly to $43.20 an hour or $89,856 yearly from January 1, 2022 to June 30, 2020 until June 30, 2022, the end of the fiscal year. From July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023 Lieutenants pay under the new contract will be increased to $45.36 an hour or $94,348.60 a year until the expiration of the contract on June 30, 2023.

LONGEVITY PAY INCREASES

APD sworn police officers are paid “longevity pay” in addition to their yearly pay. On page 9 of the new police union contract, longevity “years” is defined as the completed years of service identified by the City and documented by an officer that an officer has served as a sworn public safety officer in any United States jurisdiction in good standing, excluding military police, and for time with APD shall be complete year(s) from the date an officer achieves P2C status or if a higher rank as a lateral. Special circumstances under the contract does create exceptions to this rule. The definition of serve and service is “actual time worked”.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Note that under the union contract, lateral transfers from other departments are given credit for their years of service to the other department and are paid the longevity pay as if they had worked for APD. APD also pays lateral transfers “sign on” bonuses of $15,000 in an effort to attract experienced police officers.

APS sworn qualify for longevity pay in their fifth year of service. Under the new contract terms, longevity pay starts at $2,730 per year and increases topping of at $16,380 annually for those who have served 17 or more years.

CATEGORIES OF LONGEVITY PAY

The negotiated longevity pay under the new union contract deals with the overlap of 3 fiscal years. A fiscal year begins on July 1 of any given year and ends on June 30 of the following year. The longevity pay rates can be found on page 8 and 9 of the new union contract. The pay rate categories are as follows:

Fiscal year 2019 and 2020 longevity pay rates effective the first full pay period following July 1 are identical to fiscal year 2022. Fiscal year 2022 longevity pay scale bi-weekly annual amounts are as follows:

Beginning Year 5 through 5, $100 paid bi weekly, $2,600 annual amount
Beginning Year 6 through 6, $125 paid bi weekly $3,250 annual amount
Beginning Year 7 through 9, $225 paid bi weekly, $5,850 annual amount
Beginning Year 10 through 12, $300 paid bi weekly, $7,800, annual amount
Beginning Year 13 through 15, $350 paid bi weekly, $9,100 annual amount
Beginning Year 16 through 17, $450 paid bi weekly, $11,700 annual amount
Beginning Year 18 and above, $600 paid bi weekly, $15,600 annual amount

Fiscal year 2023 longevity pay scale bi-weekly annual amounts are as follows:

Beginning Year 5 through 5, $105 paid bi weekly, $2,730 annual amount
Beginning Year 6 through 6, $131 paid bi weekly, $3,406 annual amount
Beginning Year 7 through 9, $236 paid bi weekly, $6,136 annual amount
Beginning Year 10 through 12, $315 paid bi weekly, $8,190 annual amount
Beginning Year 13 through 15, $368 paid bi weekly, $9,568 annual amount
Beginning Year 16 through 17, $473 paid bi weekly, $12,298 annual amount
Beginning Year 18 and above, $630 paid bi weekly, $16,380 annual amount

LONGEVITY SCALE #2

There is a Longevity #2 pay scale found on page 9 of the contract that is a transitional accommodation applicable to employees currently receiving such payment and are omitted herein to avoid confusion.

SUPER LONGEVITY PAY

Once a sworn officer has been at the top step of their grade for 364 days or more, the officer will receive $34.62 per pay period. Once an officer has received this “Super Longevity”, this compensation will not be lost upon promotion within the bargaining unit. Officers currently receiving Super Longevity will continue to receive this pay during the term of the contract.

INCENTIVE PAY FOR AREA COMMAND OR INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE

Under the Union Contract, a new category of incentive pay has been created. Sworn officers can earn “incentive pay” for service in area commands or Internal Affairs. An officer will be paid $1,300.00 for each year served for the entire year in the same Area Command or the Internal Affairs Division, up to and capped at 4 years continuous service or $5,200.00 per year. A “year” is defined as from December 1 through November 30 of each calendar year.

The offering of the incentive pay for area commands is more than likely offered because certain area commands, such as the South East heights, have much higher violent crime rates and calls for service and are less desirable to work in. The offering of incentive pay to work for Internal Affairs is likely because rank and file usually vilify Internal Affairs and view it as the division that does not have “the back of police and do not look the other way” but are responsible for investigating police misconduct and violations of the personnel rules and regulations.

The incentive payment will be made on or about December 15th of each year. Time served in a single Area Command or in Internal Affairs from December 1, 2020 through November 30, 2021 will be accepted as Year 1, and no service before December 1, 2020 will be accepted. This incentive pay will not create an entitlement or right to a bid, position in Internal Affairs, an area command, shift, days off or field position in any officer.

To qualify for the incentive pay, an officer must have achieved and maintain all qualifications for the field or internal affairs positions, including certifications, or the incentive pay is forfeited. Any permanent transfer, or temporary transfer exceeding 45 calendar days, out of the officer’s Area Command or the Internal Affairs Division, whether initiated by the officer or City, results in the forfeiture of the incentive pay.

VACATION RATE ACCURALS

Under the union contract, vacation pay is as follows:

Less than 5 years continuous service accrual per year: 3.85 bi weekly accrual rate for two week pay period, 12.5 days per year.

More than 5 years and less than 10-year continuous service accrual per year: 4.62 hours bi weekly accrual rate for two week pay period, 15.0 days per year.

More than 10 years and less than 15 years continuous service accrual per year: 5.54 hours bi weekly accrual rate for two week pay period, 18.0 days per year.

More than 15 years continuous service accrual per year: 6.16 hours bi weekly accrual rate, 20.0 days per year.

Vacation hours can be “banked” by police officers and carried over to subsequent years and officers are not required to “use it or lose it” in the year the vacation time is earned. Further, once accumulated, vacation time becomes a “vested property right” and must be paid out either weekly or in a “lump sum” upon departure from the city. It very common for APD police officers who “retire”to remain on city payroll, known as the early retirement payroll fund, until their vacation time is paid out. It is also common for high ranking officers who retire to be paid 5 or even 6 figure lump sum payments for their unused vacation time and unused sick leave time. Under the Public Employee Retirement Association Provisions, vacation time and sick leave time can be accumulated and combined upon retirement. If an employee terminates before retirement, the sick leave is lost and is not paid out.

OVERTIME PAY

Under the union contract, sworn police are entitled to overtime compensation at the rate of time-and-one-half of their regular straight-time rate when they perform work in excess of forty (40) hours in any one workweek. Time worked over 40 hours per week is compensated at time and a half of the officer’s regular rate of pay, or in the form of “compensatory time.” There is no contract provision placing a cap on the amount of overtime any officer can be paid.

Compensatory time is the award of hours as already worked to be paid and is calculated at the rate of 1-1/2 times the hours actually worked. The maximum accrual of comp time for any officer is 150 hours.

CITY AND UNION REACTION TO NEW CONTRACT

Police Chief Harold Medina said the collective bargaining agreement shows the Keller Administration “continues to invest in competitive salaries for APD officers to attract and retain officers and improve community-oriented policing.”

Not at all surprising, Shaun Willoughby, president of the Albuquerque Police Officers’ Association said he was “very happy with it” seeing as he was the one who negotiated the contract. Willoughby applauded the pay increases and said they would help in recruiting and retaining sworn officers and said:

“We had, I believe, over 175 officers … leave the department in 2021. We had 81 leave in 2020. … So we are definitely needing to continue to bring that competitive pay, and that competitive edge … so that we can compete in this region of the United States for the best and brightest that are interested in law enforcement.”

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

The Keller Administration’s new negotiated contract with the police union is another lost opportunity to reform the Albuquerque Police Department and to implement the Department of Justice reforms. No doubt the police union is ecstatic given the fact that the Keller Administration did exactly what it did 4 years ago which was to cave into union demands and giving it all the pay increases it demanded with the city getting absolutely no concessions from it. The Keller Administration failed to get concessions from the union on police misconduct accountability, prohibiting management positions of sergeants and lieutenants from joining the union, and overtime limitations.

MONEY DOES NOT CHANGE NOR DOES IT BUY GOOD MORALE

Police Union President Shaun Willoughby saying he is “very happy” with the new union contract is nothing more than a victory lap on his part seeing as he negotiated the contract. He is also a fool to think the pay raises will stop the hemorrhaging of sworn police leaving in droves.

Willoughby is seriously mistaken to think that an 8% pay increase phased in and a 5% increase in longevity pay is going to make any difference in recruiting and retention. It will not and cops will still leave in droves. Willoughby has only himself to blame in that he has repeatedly hammered on his very false narrative that the DOJ reforms have made it impossible for sworn police to do their jobs and that moral is at historical low. He also said:

“I don’t know a single police officer who would recommend the Albuquerque Police Department as a place of employment.”

On October 29, 2021, a little more 3 months ago, the union released its poll on its membership satisfaction. The highlights of the poll are worth remembering:

85% of those surveyed have considered leaving the force, up 5% from last year.
89% do not feel supported by command staff.
94% do not approve of Police Chief Harold Medina.
98% do not feel supported by Mayor Tim Keller’s administration.
42% said Department of Justice reform constraints are the biggest contributor to the crime problem in the city.
24% said it was “justice system problems”, ostensibly meaning the revolving door criminal justice system.
Only 5% said lack of officers is contributing to high crime rates.

When the poll was released, Willoughby said stagnant recruiting, DOJ reform efforts and the Keller administration have brought morale to its lowest levels in decades.

Willoughby had this to say about the survey:

“These are actual police officers, the men and women that are keeping this community safe at night, and this is how they feel. Let’s take it seriously, for the first time ever, and let’s try to fix it. … This departments not worried about crime. … This department’s worried about compliance and DOJ reforms and it’s really hard. … [Sworn police] feel handcuffed, they’re frustrated that the citizens are frustrated, and nobody is allowed to do police work.”

“All these politicians will tell you we’ve got to do both simultaneously. Not a realistic expectation. … [APD sworn police] do not feel like they have a recipe for success. … 85% of them are looking for other jobs in a year where 137 police officers have already left followed by a year where 81 police officers left last year. I mean we have a natural attrition rate in this police department dating back 20 years of 60. So they’ve got a serious problem on their hands and I think it starts with treating your employees with a little more respect. … I don’t know a single police officer who would recommend the Albuquerque Police Department as a place of employment.”

OVERTIME PAY MAJOR SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY AND SCANDAL

It is the mandated overtime provisions of the union contract that has led to major controversy and scandal at times, including overtime time card fraud. When you add overtime paid to the base hourly pay mandated under the contract, the net result is the sworn police can be paid twice or three times as much in base pay and well over $100,000 and upwards of $200,000 a year.

No effort was made to reduce the number of hours allowed for overtime a sworn officer can be paid nor limiting it to rank and file and not management who are at will. From a personnel management standpoint, excessive overtime can lead to serious burn out, reduce the alertness of an officer and endanger public safety. But the union only sees the dollar signs and could care less how much excessive overtime a cop works, just as long as they get paid for it.

During the last 10 years, the Albuquerque Police Department has consistently gone over its overtime budgets by millions. In fiscal year 2016, APD was funded for $9 million for over time but APD actually spent $13 million. A March, 2017 city internal audit of APD’s overtime spending found police officers “gaming the system” that allows them to accumulate excessive overtime at the expense of other city departments. A city internal audit report released in March, 2017 revealed that the Albuquerque Police Department spent over $3.9 million over its $9 million “overtime” budget.

https://www.petedinelli.com/2018/03/30/apd-overtime-pay-abuse-and-recruitment-tool/

At the beginning of each calendar year, City Hall releases the top 250 wage earners for the previous year. The list of 250 top city hall wages earners is what is paid for the full calendar year of January 1, to December 31 of any given year. The 2019 and the 2020 city hall 250 highest paid wage earnings shows the extent of excessive overtime paid to APD sworn police. For both the years of 2019 and 2020, 160 of 250 top paid city hall employees were police who were paid between $107,885.47 to $199,666.40.
In 2019, there were 70 APD patrol officers in the list of 250 top paid employees earning pay ranging from $108,167 to $188,844. There were 32 APD lieutenants and 32 APD sergeants in the list of 250 top paid employees earning pay ranging from $108,031 to $164,722 because of overtime. In 2020, there were 69 patrol officers paid between $110,680 to $176,709, 28 APD Lieutenants and 32 APD Sergeants who were paid between $110,698 to $199,001 in the list of the 250 top paid city hall employees paid between.

NEW APD CONTRACT AGAIN ALLOWS SARGEANTS AND LIEUTENANTS TO JOIN UNION

It is Section 1.3., page 3, of the new police union contract that allows the management positions of APD sergeants and lieutenants to join the union as follows:

“The APOA is recognized as the Exclusive Representative for regular full time, non-probationary police officers through the rank of Lieutenants in the APD … .”

This is the identical provision in the expired contract that the Keller Administration ostensibly refused to negotiate. Confidential sources have confirmed that the Keller Administration and the Police Union have come to a mutual understanding that sergeants and lieutenants are not management positions but rather “supervising colleagues” who are part of a unit that give commands and that provide leadership support functions. The understanding is not embodied in the contract and contrary to basic management principals and best practices under labor law. The fact is sergeants and lieutenants are management responsible for oversight and disciplinary action of subordinates.

The New Mexico Public Employees Bargaining Act, Sections 10-7E-1 to 10-7E-26 H (NMSA 1978), governs the enforcement of the city’s collective bargaining agreement with the APD police union. The link to the statute is here:

https://www.pelrb.state.nm.us/statute.php

As the union contract is written, it is in violation of New Mexico Public Employees Bargaining Act. Section 10-7E-5 entitled Rights of public employees provides as follows:

A. Public employees, OTHER THAN MANAGEMENT EMPLOYEES and confidential employees may form, join or assist a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives chosen by public employees without interference, restraint or coercion and shall have the right to refuse those activities. (Capitalization added for emphasis)

Simply put, the plain language of the statute makes it clear management are prohibited from joining unions. The new police union contract allowing the APD management positions of sergeants and lieutenants to be police union members clearly violates state law and is therefore void from the beginning and therefor unenforceable.

The police union is a “third party intervenor” in the federal court approved settlement agreement. The police union from the beginning has consistently obstructed the implementation of the mandated reforms.

On April 27, 2021, it was widely reported that the Albuquerque Police Officers Association (APOA) launched a $70,000 false or misleading political ad campaign to discredit the Department of Justice (DOJ) mandated reforms saying the police reforms were preventing police officers from doing their jobs combating crime offering no proof. APOA Police Union President Shaun Willoughby described the need for the public relations campaign this way:

“You can either have compliance with DOJ reforms or you can have lower crime. You can’t have both. … They want to focus on the growing crime problem, instead of wasting millions of dollars on endless Department of Justice oversight. … “

APD SERGEANTS AND LIEUTENANTS RESIST DOJ REFORMS

The Federal Monitor has found repeatedly it is APD sergeants and lieutenants who are resisting management’s implementation of the DOJ reforms. Sergeants and lieutenants are where the rubber hits the road when it comes implementation of the 271 reforms.

It was on November 1, 2019, Federal Court Appointed Monitor James Ginger in his Federal Monitors 10th audit report where the “Counter CASA” effect was fully identified. According to the Federal Monitor’s 10th report:

“Sergeants and lieutenants, at times, go to extreme lengths to excuse officer behaviors that clearly violate established and trained APD policy, using excuses, deflective verbiage, de minimis comments and unsupported assertions to avoid calling out subordinates’ failures to adhere to established policies and expected practice. Supervisors (sergeants) and mid-level managers (lieutenants) routinely ignore serious violations, fail to note minor infractions, and instead, consider a given case “complete”.

In his 11th Monitors report file on May 4, 2020, Ginger wrote:

[“APD personnel are] still failing to adhere to the requirements of the CASA found in past monitoring reports, including some instances moving beyond the epicenter of supervision to mid- and upper management levels of the organization. … some in APD’s command levels continue to exhibit behaviors that “build bulwarks” [or walls] preventing fair and objective discipline, including a process of attempting to delay and in some cases successfully delaying the oversight processes until the timelines for administering discipline had been exceeded. … “

UNION REFUSES TO EXTEND TIME TO INVESTGATE POLICE MISCONDUCT CASES

A major point of contention and negotiation was the amount of time allowed to investigate police misconduct cases by Internal Affairs for purposes of disciplinary action and under the Court Approved Settlement Agreement. Under the old contract, 90 days for police misconduct investigations with an optional 30-day extension with the police chief’s approval, was provided. However, in practice, the 90 days is simply not enough time, especially when obstruction conduct are engaged in by union members.

Police Union President Shaun Willoughby bluntly told the city the union will not and was not interested in extending the timelines for investigations. The reason for that is Willoughby and his minions of sergeants and lieutenants know full well the shorter the time to investigate police misconduct cases likely means there will be no disciplinary action. The union goal is to avoid at all cost any discipline and ignore the truth of systemic police misconduct. Not once has the APD police union ever condemned police misconduct, even when mentally ill homeless camper James Boyd was gunned down in the Sandia Foothills by APD Swat nor when George Floyd was killed.

Under the old contract, 90 days for police misconduct investigations with an optional 30-day extension with the police chief’s approval, was provided for investigation. The 180 day was not included in the new contract, but the new contract did extend the time period to the full 120 days outright. It also added a 15-day preliminary review time period.

The U.S. Department of Justice and the Independent Monitor overseeing the department’s court-mandated reform effort have repeatedly criticized APD for missing deadlines mandated for police misconduct investigations.

As noted above, the federal monitor has found in his 10th and essentially affirmed in the 11th report that:

“Sergeants and lieutenants go to extreme lengths to excuse officer behaviors that violate established and trained APD policy, using excuses, deflective verbiage and unsupported assertions to avoid calling out subordinates’ failures to adhere to established policies and expected practice. Supervisors (sergeants) and mid-level managers (lieutenants) routinely ignore serious violations, fail to note minor infractions, and instead, consider a given case “complete.”

In his 14th, the federal monitor found 667 uninvestigated use of force cases and said this:

“The most important issues affecting APD during the IMR-14 reporting period involve misconduct investigations, use of force investigations, the lack of progressive discipline when misconduct is found, and supervision and leadership.

All non-force-related misconduct investigations completed by APD … were found to be deficient.

Approximately 83% of these cases are already time-barred for discipline in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement should misconduct be found. Since its discovery, this backlog has been reduced from 667 cases to 660 cases (as of October 25, 2021). At this rate of case productivity, we project that it will take APD 94 months to “clear” this second backlog, which, again, would ensure no disciplinary actions for policy violations in another 667 cases.”

INTENTIONAL BACKLOG AND NONE COMPLIANCE

The federal monitor also found:

“Given the amount of focus on the problems related to [the Internal Affairs Force Division] IAFD investigations in previous monitor’s reports, and the exceptional amounts of technical assistance provided by the monitoring team relating to IAFD processes, we can only conclude that this new backlog was intentional, and yet another canard designed to ensure that officers are not disciplined for known policy violations. We consider this another example of deliberate non-compliance exhibited by APD.

Leadership and supervision, especially in the critical areas of reform listed above, are simply lacking—or in some cases not extant. As such, these findings require direct action by the City and APD leadership to identify the causes of, and to take corrective actions responding to, what can only be described as deliberate failures to comply with existing APD policy and with CASA requirements.

Given the extensive amounts of technical assistance provided by the monitoring team related to misconduct investigations and to workload management, we can only conclude that these jarring failures are deliberate.”

TIMELINE SPELLED OUT

The new contract spells out timelines more explicitly. If the department identifies new allegations of misconduct after the officer has already been told they are being investigated, then the review can be expanded only if the investigations into both the initial allegation and the new allegation are completed within the 120-day time frame. The department can only open new investigations into the same officers and circumstances in the most egregious cases.

APD Spokesman Gilbert Gallegos sounded more like a police union operative and not a representative of the Keller Administration management team when he said the changes to the timeline should be helpful and said:

“The new 15-day period at the front end allows the department to more quickly determine all of the potential violations, if there are any, rather than waiting toward the end of the investigation. … Presumably, once the 120 day period starts, the investigation will be more efficient and not result in surprises. And eliminating the requirement to request a 30-day extension from the Chief will also make the process more efficient.”

PROTOCOLS OPPOSED BY UNION

The new contract outlines the internal investigation protocols and discipline of sworn officers.

ABQ Forward advocates APD reform mandated by the Court Approved Settlement Agreement (CASA).

APD Forward includes 19 organizations who have affiliated with each other in an effort to reform APD and implement the DOJ consent reforms. Members of APD Forward include Albuquerque Health Care for the Homeless, American Civil Liberties, Bernalillo County Community Health Council, Common Cause New Mexico, Disability Rights New Mexico, Equality New Mexico, League of Women Voters of Central New, Mexico New Mexico Conference of Churches, New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, Sierra Club Rio Grande Chapter, and the Transgender Resource Center of New Mexico.

Heather Ferguson, executive director of Common Cause New Mexico and a member of APD Forward’s steering committee, said the new union contract does not include accountability provisions. In particular, APD Forward wanted to extend the timeline for investigations police officer misconduct to 180 days which is standard to other departments around the country.

APD Forward also wanted to exclude two provisions in the new contract. The two provisions are:

1. The contract provision barring the city’s Civilian Police Oversight Agency (CPOA) board members from knowing the names of the officers the agency investigates. This provision undermines the purpose and intent of the CPOA to identify full those sworn officers who have a history of misconduct and who should be disciplined or terminated.

2. The union contract provision that requires telling officers under investigation the name of the person who complained about them. The names of complainants were in the old contract and that continue in the new. Allowing identification of complainants discourages the filing of civilian complaints for fear of retaliation.

UNION GETS CLARITY ON DISCIPLINE

The police union did get what it wanted when it demanded more clarity on when officers can be disciplined if policy violations are found by the department’s Force Review Board (FRB) after the initial investigation is completed. The FRB board is made up of command level staff who periodically review completed investigations into uses of force to catch problems or identify areas for training. Willoughby said this:

“Some cases were deemed to be in-policy, and the Force Review Board brought it back and had it reinvestigated at which the case changed [to] be out of policy and discipline was imposed.”

When asked how APD will handle cases where policy violations are found by the Force Review Board that were missed by the initial investigators, APD Spokesman Gilbert Gallegos once again sounded more like a union representative and said the board was not designed to be disciplinary and said:

The major focus is supposed to be on supervision, tactics, training, and policy. … If some of those issues are identified in the first 15 days prior to the investigation, the department can pursue those, and the investigation can proceed. But the idea is to keep the (Force Review Board’s) focus on those issues, and not the discipline.”

The FRB board is totally within its power to reopen case if and when additional information of misconduct is found. Independent Federal Monitor has noted the FRB has caught policy violations that internal affairs investigators missed, and for the FRB to ignore taking action is a dereliction of duty. The FRB may not be involved with discipline, but it has inherent authority to ask and demand discipline for egregious police misconduct.

FINAL COMMENT

Mayor Tim Keller was given a second chance when he was re-elected to reform APD and implement the APD consent decree reforms. Mayor Keller with the new union contract has essentially capitulated and once again given into all the union demands squandering an opportunity to reform APD.